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Stabilization Policies in Open Economies
AB STRAC
Thisstudy analyzes the theory of stabilization policy as it has
developed from the trade oriented models of the 1950's to the recentmodels
employing rational expectations. Throughout the study one model is presented
with appropriate modifications to take into account international capital
mobility, wage flexibility, and rational expectations. The Mundell—Fleming
model is presented but with an asset sector based on modern portfolio
theory. This same model is analyzed under conditions of full wageand price
flexibility, and the propositions associated with the monetary approach tothe
balance of payments and the exchange rate are discussed. A simplified version
of the model is then used to examine the policy ineffectiveness propositions
of the new classical economics (as applied to open economies). The study
concludes with a brief review of the literature on the choice between exchange
rate regimes.
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The modern open economy is not the one found in most macroeconomic
textbooks, an economy that occasionally imports Bordeaux wine but which
produces most of what it consumes at prices determined domestically. It is
rather an economy integrated with those abroad through commodity and financial
linkages which limit the scope for national stabilization policy. How that
happens is the subject of this chapter.
Many of our ideas about stabilization policy can be traced to what
McKinnon (1981) calls the "insular economy" which we discuss in section 2. In
such an economy, which was the paradigm most common in the 1950's and earlier,
international capital mobility is low or non—existent, money supplies are
controlled by the national authorities and price linkages across countries are
limited. (Chapter 13 describes this economy in detail.) The literature on
stabilization since the 1950's has modified this paradigm in several essential
ways. The final product might not be recognized by its original craftsmen.
It is useful to classify these progressive modifications in three
categories:
1) Capital mobility. Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) showed the importance
of international financial linkages in determining the effects of
stabilization policy. Their work will be the focus of section 3, but the
propositions associated with Mundell and Fleming will be reexamined in the
light of recent portfolio balance theories of the asset markets.
2) Wage and price flexibility. Many recent studies, including those
associated with the monetary approach to the balance of payments and with the
new classical economics, have replaced the rigid wage assumption of Mundell
and Fleming with various forms of wage flexibility. In section 4 we introduce
wage flexibility into the Mundell-Fleming model and show how much difference
1this makes in determining the effectiveness of government policy. When wages
are flexible, wealth effects become of primary importance with the
accumulation of wealth moving the economy from short run equilibrium to a long
run steady state. We illustrate this wealth accumulation process using
Dornbusch's (1973) version of the monetary approach to devaluation.
3) Rational expectations and the natural rate hypothesis. No study of
stabilization policy is complete without the "new classical macroeconomics."
This literature combines the long—run wage and price flexibility of the
classical model with an explicit treatment of expectations that includes
assumptions about the availability of information which are crucial in
determining the effectiveness of stabilization policy. In section 5 we
reexamine standard propositions about policy using rational expectations and a
stochastic supply function; in section 6 we use the same model to reexamine
the choice between exchange rate regimes and the insulating properties of
flexible rates.
Throughout the chapter, one general model is used to interpret
developments in the literature, with the model being progressively modified to
include international financial linkages, wage flexibility and stochastic
features. It focuses on a single national economy, although a foreign economy
is added later in the chapter. This economy is assumed to produce its own
(composite) good and to issue its own interest—bearing bond. In limiting
cases commodity arbitrage pegs the price of the good at purchasing power
parity and financial arbitrage pegs the interest rate at (uncovered) interest
parity. The chapter will show how stabilization policy is affected by each of
these linkages.
A chapter which treats such a broad range of issues must draw the line
somewhere. We do not attempt to discuss the literature on non—traded goods or
2bonds. Nor do we discuss in detail the dynamic responses to policy changes
that have been a dominant feature of some recent models. (Chapters 15 and 18
analyze this literature.) Even so, our general model will be required to span
a wide range of recent developments. A single unifying framework will serve
to place these developments in a clear perspective.
2. Stabilization policy in the insular economy
The balance of payments and exchange rate play very different roles in
stabilization policy depending upon whether or not there is capital
mobility. We begin the analysis of stabilization policy using a model without
any capital account. This is the model of Harberger (1950), Tinbergen (1952),
Tslang (1961), and above all Meade (1951), which dominated the literature on
international monetary economics until the 1960's.
The model varies from one study to another, but a number of character-
istics are typical of most of the studies. First, the model is "Keynesian' in
that nominal wages are fixed, at least over the time horizon relevant for
policy. Second, the money supply is regarded as a policy instrument under the
complete control of the authorities. (Alternatively, the interest rate may be
controlled by the authorities.) All balance of payments flows are sterilized
by open market sales or purchases of securities or by other policy actions.
Third, the financial sector is simplified considerably by the immobility of
capital. Usually, portfolios contain only one asset other than money, and the
market for that asset is treated only implicitly. Finally expectations are
ignored.
We introduce below a model of a small country that illustrates all of
these characteristics. The country is small in that it does not significantly
3affect foreign variables such as the price of foreign output.1 Nextwe
summarize some of the main conclusions about stabilization policy thatcan be
derived from this model. Some of these conclusions arevery sensitive to the
precise specification of the model, so we conclude the section by discussing
modifications of the model.
2.1. A model of trade and output
Since this model is a standard one in most respects, the description will
be brief. The model, consists of six equations:2
Y=Z+G0+B, (2.1)
ZZ'(Y, r, A/P), 0 < Z < 1, V < 0, Z > 0, (2.2)
BB(Z, PlPx),1 < B < 0, Bf > 0, Bp < O (2.3)
Y =Q(P/W),Q> 0, (2.4)
M/P =m'(Y,r, Alp),m>0 ,m'< 0, 0 < (A in/M) < 1,, (2.5)
X'='B. (2.6)
Equation (2.1) describes the demand for output in the home country; it must
'Theterm small country often refers to a country producing the same good
as other countries, but the country in this model is assumed to produce its
owngoodexcept in the limiting case where domestic and foreign goods are
perfect substitutes.
2The prime notation, V and m', is used todistinguish these
functions from the corresponding ones in the next section. Restrictionson
the partial derivatives are given directly following the function. The
notation used for derivatives is straightforward; Z', Z', refer to the
partial derivatives with respect to the three arguments of the function. To
simplify the expressions, the derivatives are calculated at a stationary
equilibrium where all prices (and the exchange rate) are equal to one.
4equal expenditure by domestic residents (Z), and the government (G0) plus the
trade balance (B), all measured in units of domestic output. Expenditure by
residents (2.2) is a function of income (Y), the interest rate (r), and the
real wealth of domestic residents; real wealth is the sum (A) ofmoney and
domestic bonds deflated by the domestic price (P).3 The trade balance (2.3)
is a function of domestic expenditure, foreign expenditure (Zr), and the terms
of trade, defined as where P and are the prices of domestic and
foreign goods, respectively, and X is the domestic currency price of foreign
currency. The trade balance is assumed to be negatively related to the terms
oftrade (B < 0), which is the case if the Marshall—Lerner condition is
satisfied.4
The aggregate supply curve (2.4) describes the response of output
(income) to an increase in the price of the domestic good, holding constant
the nominal wage (W). Some models of this type fix the price of the good
itself, but not much is gained by this further simplification of the model.
The demand function for money (2.5) has a standard form familiar from models
of the closed economy. The restriction on the wealth elasticity includes two
limiting cases; the demand for money can be independent of wealth, as in the
quantity theory, or can be homogeneous of degree one in wealth, as in some
3We assume that all bonds are issued by thegovernment. We discuss below
the issue of whether bonds can be included in wealth.
4That condition states that with initially balanced trade,a fall in the
terms of trade improves the trade balance if the sum of the import and export
demand elasticities exceeds unity. Note that the trade and current account
balances are identical in this model since we ignore transfer payments and
services.
5asset models. Equation (2.6) is a balance of payments equation describing the
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (Fm).
The four equations jointly determine four variables: the domestic price,
output, interest rate and either foreign exchange reserves or the exchange
rate, depending upon the exchange rate regime. We begin by describing the
flexible exchange rate regime.
2.2. Flexible exchange rates
With capital immobile, the exchange rate is determined entirely by flow
conditions, as indicated by the balance of payments equation (2.6). Since the
balance of payments consists of the trade account only, the exchange rate must
adjust to keep the trade balance at zero:
B(Z, Z, p/px) =0. (2.3)'
This leads to very strong conclusions about domestic policy. Domestic output
is determined as it would be in a closed economy:
yz + c0. (2.1)'
The three equations determining domestic variables, (2.1)', (2.4), and (2.5),
are now independent of the exchange rate and the parameters of the trade
balance function, so monetary and fiscal policies have effects similar to
those in a closed economy.
Without describing the full solution of the model, we can illustrate the
effects of stabilization policy by calculating the multiplier for government
spending. As is usually the case, it is obtained by assuming that the
domestic price is constant (here we assume that is infinite) and that the
domestic interest rate is pegged by monetary policy. Therefore,
dG
1
,>• (2.7)
0
The multiplier is identical to that of a closed economy; in particular, it is
independent of the parameters of the trade balance.
6A second striking conclusion is closely related to the first: domestic
output and other domestic variables are independent of all foreign
disturbances. The exchange rate completely insulates the economy from changes
in foreign prices and foreign expenditure, the two foreign variables affecting
the trade balance, so no foreign disturbance can affect the economy. This
strong conclusion about insulation has often been used as an argument for
flexible rates, even though it is very sensitive to assumptions about capital
mobility.
2.3. Fixed exchange rates
With fixed exchange rates, the trade balance directly affects output in
equation (2.1), so the effects of domestic policy are modified by interaction
with the foreign sector. Both monetary and fiscal policies are generally less
effective in changing domestic output than under flexible rates, because of
the leakage of expenditure onto imports. The multiplier for government
spending, for example, is
dG0
1 —z(1+ Bz)
(2.8)
which is smaller than before, since —1< B < 0. A rise in government
spending leads to a leakage of private expenditure onto imports, whereas there
is no net effect on the trade balance under flexible rates.5
51n the general model where interest rates are variable, a rise in
government spending could raise output more under fixed rates than under
flexible rates if expenditure were sufficiently sensitive to the interest
rate; a rise in the interest rate could reduce (crowd out) expenditure and
thus reduce imports. The trade balance would improve under fixed rates, so
the domestic currency would appreciate under flexible rates. This result is
precluded in versions of the open economy model where the trade balance is
expressed as a function of domestic output rather than expenditure.
7Foreign disturbances now affect the economy through the trade balance.
An expansion abroad that raises foreign output, the foreign price, or both
leads to an expansion of domestic output. The domestic economy becomes
sensitive to foreign developments, including policies pursued by foreign
governments.
Another much discussed result emerges from this same model. Under fixed
exchange rates, there is a conflict between internal and external balance when
a country is in one of two situations: with a balance of payments deficit and
unemployment or a balance of payments surplus and full employment.6 In either
case, fiscal and monetary policies have undesirable effects on either internal
or external balance. If there is a balance of payments deficit and unemploy-
ment, for example, an expansionary policy can eliminate unemployment, but it
also leads to a deterioration of the trade balance. What is required in this
situation, according to Johnson (1958), is an "expenditure switching" policy
which is aimed at lowering the trade deficit at any given level of output.
Corden (1960) examines various ways this policy could be carried out.
One such expenditure—switching policy is a devaluation. In this model,
it unambiguously raises domestic output while improving the trade balance. In
the simplest version, with fixed prices and a pegged interest rate, the
multiplier for the change in the exchange rate is
dY _________________
dX
—
1 Z,(1 + Bz)
> 0, (2.9)
while the change in the trade balance is
6The second of these situations is usually described as a balance of
payments surplus and "inflation", but models of this type are not well suited
for describing inflationary situations.
8—B 1 —Z'
dB— P 210 i-l_ZJi(l+Bz)
>0.
Using these expressions, we can interpret the two analytical approaches to
devaluation often discussed in connection with models of this type, the
elasticities and absorption approaches. (For the two approaches, see
Robinson, 1937, and Alexander, 1952). According to the former, the trade
balance improves following a devaluation if the Marshall—Lerner condition is
satisfied, or B < 0. This condition is clearly based on a partial
equilibrium analysis of the trade sector alone. The absorption approach is
more concerned with the macroeconomic response to a devaluation; the trade
balance is said to improve following a devaluation if output rises more than
expenditure. That is the case in (2.10) provided the marginal propensity to
spend is less than one. We discuss a more recent approach to devaluation, the
monetary approach, in detail below.
2.4. Modifications of the model
Many results obtained above depend upon characteristics of the model
which are more appropriate for a closed economy. Real domestic income, for
J. ..1___ 1 0.4- 4 .LuLJ.L1eu LUUequ.LvEli.euL. LU L&JJLL
economyreal income is more appropriately defined as PYII, where I is a
general price index including foreign as well as domestic prices:
,a (PfX)l_a (2.11)
Real expenditure should similarly be redefined as PZ/I and expressed as a
function of real income. This respecification of the expenditure function
leads to what is known as the Laursen—Metzler effect of a change in the terms
of trade.7 A fall in the terms of trade, which reduces P/I, leads to a fall
7See Laursen and Metzler (1950). Dornbusch (1980, pp. 78—81) has a clear
explanation of this effect.
9in domestic expenditure measured in terms of the general price index but a
rise in domestic expenditure measured in terms of the domestic good itself.
Other changes in specification might be made for similar reasons. All
assets and wealth might be deflated by the general price index. Thus real
money balances might be defined as MIt and treated as a function of real
wealth, A/I, as well as real income. To the extent that expectations are
explicitly modelled, the interest rate in the aggregate demand function might
be specified in real terms as the nominal rate less the expected inflation
rate of the general price index (the latter denoted by lit). Finally,
aggregate supply might be made a function of the price index, if wages vary at
all. The first three of these changes will be adopted in the model introduced
in the next section; wages will be made a function of the price index in a
later section.
How much difference do all of these changes make? The answer certainly
depends upon the actual magnitude of each effect. But notice that one
dramatic result is overturned in the model used above once the general price
level (and hence the exchange rate) is able to influence expenditure directly.
Flexible rates no longer insulate the domestic economy from foreign
disturbances. Indeed there are several channels through which the general
price level, and therefore the exchange rate itself, can affect domestic
variables.
3. Capital mobility and the Mundell—Fleming propositions
Few studies in international economics have had as much impact on the
direction of research as those of Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962). These
studies showed how important capital mobility is to the conduct of
stabilization policy, thus overturning many earlier propositions about policy,
while redirecting attention towards the capital account and financial
10phenomena in general.
The two studies differed in their assumptions about the degree of capital
mobility, Mundell assuming that there was perfect capital mobility between
domestic and foreign countries. Their propositions about stabilization policy
differed accordingly. Mundell's propositions were particularly dramatic. In
a small open economy,
(1) monetary policy is ineffective in changing output under fixed
exchange rates because capital flows offset a monetary expansion or
contraction;
(2) fiscal policy is ineffective in changing output under flexible rates
because the exchange rate induces adjustments in the trade account which
run counter to the fiscal policy.
In Fleming's model, where capital mobility was imperfect, each policy retained
some effectiveness under both exchange rate regimes. His conclusions
concerned the relative effectiveness of the two policies:
(1) Monetary policy is more effective in changing output under flexible
rates than under fixed rates;
(2) fiscal policy is more effective in changing output under fixed
exchange rates when capital is highly mobile, but this conclusion is
reversed with low capital mobility.8
Both sets of propositions are modified -in more general models, as we shall see
below, but they have had a powerful influence on subsequent thinking about
8Capital mobility is relatively low in his model if an increase in
government spending leads to a trade deficit larger than the capital inflow
induced by the corresponding increase in the interest rate. See Whitman
(1970) for a full discussion.
11stabilization policy. Whitman (1970) has provided a concise summary of these
and other studies in the same tradition.
We will review these propositions within the context of a model somewhat
different from those used by Mundell and Fleming. We retain the fixed nominal
wage assumption characteristic of Keynesian models but modify the expenditure
function to incorporate terms of trade and wealth effects that may be
particularly important when there is a flexible exchange rate. The most
important change, however, is on the financial side. Fleming specified
capital flows as a function of the level of the interest rate, but modern
portfolio theory indicates that the stock of assets rather than the flow
should be a function of the interest rate.9 According to this latter view,
capital flows occur as a result of more general portfolio adjustments
encompassing money balances as well as domestic and foreign bond holdings. In
place of the balance of payments flow (the time derivative of foreign exchange
reserves), which was the center of attention in the Fleming model, we have an
equation explaining the stock of foreign exchange reserves; it is one of the
equations explaining asset market equilibrium.10 Other differences between
9One implausible implication of the Fleming specification is that a rise
in the domestic interest rate causes a continuing inflow of capital, whether
portfolios are growing or not. Branson (1968) and Willett and Forte (1969)
were among the first to formulate the portfolio balance approach to the
capital account. In Mundell's (1963) model, with perfectly mobile capital,
this question of specification does not arise.
is the case with most portfolio balance models, the model is
specified in continuous time. It can be specified in discrete time, as in
Henderson (1981) and Tobin and de Macedo (1980), and a balance of payments
(continued)
12the model here and its antecedents are discussed below.
This section focuses on many of the issues that Mundell and Fleming
emphasized and on which later authors expanded,including the offsetting
effect of capital flows and the feasibility of sterilization. In addition, we
compare the relative effectiveness of stabilization policies under fixed and
flexible rates. The discussion draws on an excellent survey of these issues
by Henderson (1977).
3.1. A model with internationally mobile capital
The model introduced in this section will be used to describe stabiliza-
tion policy in both this section and the next (where we consider a classical
model with flexible wages). The model is complicated because it includes
price and wealth effects and because domestic and foreign securities are
treated as imperfect substitutes. Behavior in the model, however, can be
summarized in a simple diagram which will be used to illustrate the effects of
different stabilization policies.
We begin with the market for the domestic good:
YZ + G0 + B , (3.1)
f.= z[9),r—ir1, rf-f.r_w1, 4, (3.2)
0 < Z < 1, Zr < 0, Zf < 0, ZA > 0
BB(z,p/(px),'1 < Bz < 0, Bf > 0, Bp < 0 (33)
Y =Q(P/W),Q > 0 . (3.4)
equation can be derived from the rest of the model, but such a model bears
little resemblance to the earlier capital flow specification of Fleming and
others.
13The model is identical to the earlier one except for the expenditure equation
(3.2), where expenditure and disposable income are deflated by the general
price index, thus incorporating the Laursen—Metzler effect of a change in the
terms of trade. Disposable income is defined as income less taxes, the latter
being exogenous to the model.11 Expenditure is also a function of real
wealth, where wealth is now defined as the sum of money, domestic bonds and
foreign bonds held by the domestic private sector: A =M÷+X Fd.
Finally, expenditure is expressed as a function of the domestic and foreign
real interest rates. The nominal return on the foreign bond is defined as the
nominal foreign interest rate plus the expected appreciation of the foreign
currency, both Interest rates are then expressed In real terms by
subtracting the expected rate of inflation of the general price index,
=a11+
(1_a)rr
0< e< 1,
0< e< 1.
For this part of the analysis, expectations are modeled in two alternative
ways found frequently in the literature: regressive expectations (with ep and
eX being positive constants less than or equal to one)where a rise In the
current price or exchange rate leads to an expected fall in that variable
towards some stationary value (,) andstatic expectations (with ep and eX
11lnterest receipts and payments are Ignored in the model.
Alternatively, they could be explicitly introduced into the expressions for
disposable income and the current account but neutralized by taxes and
transfers. Allen and Kenen (1980, 40—42) describe how this can be done.
14being equal to zero) where the expected level of the price or exchange rate
rises with the current level so that no further change is expected. We
postpone until a later section a discussion of rational expectations.
The equations for the goods market contain four endogenous variables of
interest to the analysis: Y, P, r, and either X or XFm (the level of foreign
exchange reserves). According to equation (3.4), however, changes in P are
always related to changes in Y as follows, dP =dY/Q,so that we can
eliminate price from all expressions in the model and thus concentrate on only
three variables.
The curve labelled GG in figure 1 describes combinations of Y and r that
give equilibrium in the goods market. The slope of this curve reflects the
direct effects of output and the interest rate on expenditure (as well as the
indirect effect of the domestic price). To obtain an expression for this
slope, we first take the total differentials of equations (3.1)—(3.4) and
combine them in the compact form shown in the first row of the matrix in table
1. The matrix itself describes equilibrium under either flexible rates (XdFm
=0)or fixed rates (dx=0).The expression G, + reflects the direct
and indirect effects of higher output on the goods market, while Gr reflects
the direct effect of a higher interest rate. Since increases in Y or r both
raise the excess supply of the domestic good (i.e., G + andGr are
positive), the goods market curve GG must have a negative slope.
The definitions and signs of and all other coefficients are given in
the table. (To simplify these expressions, we have assumed that all prices,
including the exchange rate, are initially equal to one). All of the signs
follow directly from the earlier assumptions, with two exceptions: For A to
be positive, the elasticity of expenditure with respect to disposable income
must be less than one. This condition ensures that the Laursen—Metzler effect
15r
Figure 1. Increase in Government Spending
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LTABLE 1. MODIFIED MUNDELL—FLEMING MODEL
(G + G/Q)C 0 Cr dY
dG0
(L+LIQ) Lx —(1+s) Lr
xciFm dH
(H + H/Q) Hx 8 Hr dr
—dH
=[1—(1+ Bz)Zy] > 0
=(1+ Bz)EA —aep(Zr+ Zf) + a
ZAAI
—B> 0
A(1—a)[Z —Z(Y
—T)]> 0
Gx ——(1+ Bz)[A + e(Zr(1_a) —Zf(a))+ zA(Fd —A(1—a))]+ B < 0
Cr =—(1+ Bz) Zr > 0,
L
= >0
L=m<0 rr
L
=[mY(1—a) + a(m(.) —
mAA)] > 0
Lx =[(1—a)(m(')
—m'r)—
mfe + mA(F
—A(1—a))]> 0 ,
H—h+ h > 0
[hY(1—a) + a(h(.)—
hAA)] < 0
-[(1—a)(h(.)-hY)+h(.)+(h—
hf)eX+hA(Fd
—A(1—a))]>O .
16obtains; a fall in the terms of trade raises expenditure measured in terms of
the domestic good. The other exception concerns the sign of C. This model
allows the exchange rate to affect the goods market through three channels:
(a) relative price effects that work directly on the trade balance and through
the Laursen—Metzler effect on expenditure; (b) exchange rate and inflationary
expectations that drive the two real interest rates in different directions;
and (c) the effect of the exchange rate on real wealth (which can either rise
or fall in response to a rise in the exchange rate).'2 For Cxtobe negative,
the relative price effect must outweigh the latter two effects (if either or
both are negative).'3 When Cxisnegative, a rise in the exchange rate (a
devaluation or a depreciation of the domestic currency) shifts the CC schedule
to the right.
The behavior of the financial markets is of central interest to the
rise in the exchange rate has two effects on real wealth: it raises
the nominal value of wealth by Fd dX (when Fd is positive), but it lowers the
real value of any given ount of nominal wealth by A diA(i—a)dX, since it
raises the cost of imported goods in the price index.
13Under plausible conditions, these latter effects could both be equal to
zero. The net effect of a change in the expected exchange rate is equal to
zero when the partial derivatives of expenditure with respect to the two real
interest rates are proportional to the shares of domestic and foreign goods in
the consumption basket, Zr/Zf —a/(1—a).The wealth effect of an exchange
rate change is equal to zero when the ratio of foreign assets to wealth is the
same as the proportion of foreign goods in the consumption basket, Fd/A
(1—a). Such a diversification rule is given in Dornbusch (1982). But Cx
could be negative under much weaker conditions.
17following discussion. The asset model described below is an open economy
version of the Tobin—Brainard model as developed by Black (1973), Boyer
(1975), Branson (1974), Girton and Henderson (1976, 1977) among others. Three
assets are assumed to be available to domestic investors; money, CM),
domestic bonds (Hd) and foreign bonds (F'1), the latter available at an
exogenous interest rate. There is no banking system in the model, so M also
represents the monetary base. Foreign investors may hold domestic bonds but
do not hold domestic money. The domestic demands for the two domestic assets
are described by equations (3.5) and (3.7), the domestic demand for the
foreign bond by (3.9), and the foreign demand for the domestic bond by (3.8).
M m[.q._, r, r + iii'-41 I—Hm+ XF', (3.5)
0 < Y rfl/M 1 m < O mf < O 0 A mA/M 1,
Hd÷Hf=H0_Hm, (3.6)
Rd —h[f!._,r,r +x'4i, (3.7)
h < 0, h > 0, hf (0, 1AhA/Hd,
—h[y,r —ir,r, A/P]P, (3.8)
4<0,h> 0, h< 0, h> 0,
X Fdf[!!._ r, r +WV _4]i, (3•9)
fy<0 r<o' ff>0 1 AfA/(XF)s
The real demands for these assets are functions of real income, the expected
returns on domestic and foreign bonds, and real wealth. The restrictions on
the partial derivatives of the asset demands reflect the following assump-
tions: (a) all assets are assumed to be gross substitutes, i.e., a rise in
18the own (cross) return raises (lowers) the demand for that asset; (b) a rise
in income raises the demand for money and lowers the demands for the other
assets, but the income elasticity of money demand is assumed to be less than
or equal to one; (c) a rise in wealth leads to an equal or more than
proportionate rise in the demand for domestic and foreign bonds, and an equal
or less than proportionate rise in the demand for money. These are all
plausible assumptions that have been frequently adopted in theliterature.'4
The asset demands of domestic residents as well as the expenditure
function introduced above are expressed as functions of real (domestic)
wealth, where wealth includes bond holdings as well as money holdings. Barro
(1974) has recently revived interest in the proposition that government bonds
do not represent net wealth. The basic question at issue is whether
individuals fully discount the future taxes implicit in any issue of
government debt. Buiter and Tobin (1979) discuss the strong assumptions
necessary for this proposition to hold, such as the absence of
intergenerational distribution effects.'5 Here we adopt the conventional
definition of financial wealth that ignores future taxes; this definition thus
may overstate the magnitude of the real effects discussed below when there is
14Gross substitutibility is not a necessary consequence of expected
utility maximization, although it is almost always assumed in asset market
studies. Moneydemandis often assumed to be insensitive to wealth or to be
homogeneous of degree one in wealth; these assumptions are limiting cases of
the one adopted here.
15Voluntary intergenerational gifts can neutralize the real effects of
involuntary redistribution by the government, but only under certain
conditions. See Buiter and Tobin (1979).
19at least partial capitalization of future taxes.16
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) equate the demands for money and domestic
bonds, respectively, to their supplies. The supply of money is equal to the
assets held by the central bank, which consist of domestic and foreign
bonds. (We have omitted a balancing item which is needed to cancel capital
gains earned by the monetary authority on changes in the foreign exchange
rate.) The supply of domestic bonds consists of the total government issue
less that held by the central bank. The supplies of these assets are related
by sterilization policy. We consider below two possibilities, that the
authorities sterilize all foreign exchange flows or do not sterilize any. In
the former case, the domestic bonds held by the central bank become
endogenous, so it is useful to describe the change in its domestic assets as
the sum of two components:
dHn_dR+SXdFm, (3.10)
The first term represents a discretionary change in domestic assets, indepen-
dent of sterilization policy; the second term describes the endogenous
response of domestic assets to a change in foreign exchange reserves. The
parameter s is the sterilization coefficient, which is assumed to vary between
zero and minus one. When no sterilization is carried out (s0), the supply
of money is an endogenous variable under fixed exchange rates with the change
related issue is whether exchange market intervention, which
transfers ownership of foreign assets from the private sector to the
government, can have any real effects. Obstfeld (1981) discusses the case
where the private sector "sees through" these transactions; it capitalizes
future transfers from the government financed by foreign interest payments (in
effect regarding official foreign exchange holdings as its own).
20in that supply given by dH + X dF'. When full sterilization is practiced
(a =—1),the supply of bonds available to the public becomes endogenous, with
the change in that supply given by -dH + X dF'.
In figure 1, the curves labelled LL and RH describe combinations of Y and
r that give equilibrium in the markets for money and domestic bonds.17 The
slopes of these curves can be obtained from the equilibrium conditions for the
two asset markets summarized by the second and third rows of the matrix
expression in table 1.The signs of the asset coefficients follow from the
earlier assumptions, with one exception. For Lx and Hx to be positive, the
transactions and expectations effects must outweigh the wealth effect in cases
where the latter is negative. (As discussed below, assumptions are frequently
adopted which make Lx0). The relative slopes of LL and RH depend upon the
two assumptions adopted earlier regarding gross substitutability and wealth
elasticities •18
One additional characteristic of the HR schedule is of special
interest. It becomes infinitely elastic when domestic and foreign bonds are
'7Stabilization policy has often been illustrated in a diagram with a
balance of payments curve instead of a bond market curve. Most of the studies
of the 1960's which specified capital flows as a function of the interest rate
level used such a diagram. Henderson (1981) uses a balance of payments curve
in a discrete time model based on asset demand functions like those presented
here. The alternative diagram presented here was developed by Boyer (1978a)
and Henderson (1979).
18The relative slopes of these curves can be established under weaker
assumptions, as is evident from the expressions for (H + H/Q) and
(L + L/Q).
21perfect substitutes. (HH becomes flat as Hr =hr+ h goes to infinity).
This was the assumption adopted by Mundell (1963) as well as bymany other
authors since. We shall discuss its important implications below.
Before proceeding further, we should clarify the nature of the short run
equilibrium described in table 1. All asset markets are assumed to be in
continuous equilibrium in the sense that existing stocks of assets are
willingly held. In this model, however, there is nothing to prevent asset
stocks from changing continuously through time. In particular, a government
deficit will generate a flow supply of government bonds: =
P(G0
—T),
where H0 denotes the time derivative, dH0/dt. This flow supply is to be
distinguished from a discrete change in the supply of bonds at one point in
time associated, for example, with an open market operation, dH. Similarly,
a balance of payments surplus under fixed exchange rates will generate a flow
.1 supplyof foreign exchange reserves: X FmP B + H —xr •Thisflow
supply is to be distinguished from the discrete change In foreign exchange
reserves, X dF'', which occurs as a result of an instantaneous switch in
portfolios or a single exchange market operation.
These flow supplies of assets, whether due to government deficits or
payments imbalances, affect output and other variables in the model by
altering gradually the stock of each asset, thereby moving the economy, In the
words of Blinder and Solow (1973), from one Instantaneous equilibrium to
another.'9 Because the stocks of assets change through time, the cumulative
effects of stabilization policies vary with the time span over which policies
are examined. (The longer the time span, however, the less tenable is the
19Branson (1974) applied the closedeconomy analysis of Blinder and
Solow to the case of an open economy under fixed exchange rates.
22Keynesian assumption of fixed nominal wages.) To simplify the discussion
below, we focus mostly on the impact effects of policies and thus ignore the
effects of these flow supplies.20 In table 1, for example, only the impact
effects of policies are shown. Readers interested in the longer run effects
of the policies are referred to McKinnon and Oates (1966) and other studies.2'
3.2. Stabilization policy under fixed exchange rates
Under fixed exchange rates, the equations of table 1 determine domestic
output and the interest rate on domestic bonds as well as foreign exchange
reserves CX Fm). The system of equations, in fact, is recursive under two
alternative assumptions regarding sterilization:
(1) With no sterilization (s0), the equations describing equilibrium in
the goods and bond markets determine output and the interest rate, with the
money market equation determining the (instantaneous) change in foreign
20wich rational expectations or perfect foresight, however, future
changes in stocks can affect endogenous variables immediately. Chapter 15
shows how, under perfect foresight, the eventual accumulation of wealth
through the current account affects the current values of endogenous
variables, including the exchange rate; chapter 18 analyzes'other dynamic
models under perfect foresight. We discuss rational expectations in section
5, but in models where the dynamics of asset accumulation are not essential to
the analysis.
21McKinnon and Oates analyze a long run (stationary state) equilibrium
where wealth accumulation has ceased. Turnovsky (1976) examines the dynamics
around such a stationary state equilibrium using flow equations such as those
introduced above. See also Branson (1974) and Allen and Kenen (1980,
especially chapters 6 and 10).
23exchange reserves. In terms of figure 1, equilIbrium Is determined by the GG
and HH schedules, with the LL schedule shifting in response to changes in
foreign exchange reserves.
(2) With full sterilization (s ——1),the equations for the goods and money
markets determine output and the interest rate, with the bond equation deter-
mining the change in foreign exchange reserves. Equilibrium is determined by
the GG and LL schedules, with the HH schedules shifting in response to changes
in foreign exchange reserves.
In this section we use this system of equations together with
accompanying diagrams to interpret twotypesof stabilization policies: an
increase in government spending and an open market expansion of themoney
supply. The role of sterilization will be discussed in connection with
government spending where a geometric illustration of its effects is
particularly simple.
The increase in government spending Is assumed to fall exclusively on
domestic goods. The spending is financed by the issue of government bonds
rather than by taxes, with the government deficit generating a flow supply of
bonds but no discrete change in the bond supply capable of affecting current
variables. With no sterilization, an Increase in spending leads to a rise in
output and the interest rate. In fIgure 1, point a is reached where the new
G'G' schedule intersects with a constant Hil schedule. The effect of the
policy on foreign exchange reserves is evident from the figure, since money
market equilibrium requires a rightward shift (not shown) of the LL curve to
point a and thus a rise in the money supply. The magnitude of the increase in
foreign exchange reserves depends upon the degree of substitutability between
domestic and foreign bonds, as reflected in the slope of HH. Since foreign
exchange reserves increase under fixed exchange rates, we should expect the
24domestic currency to appreciate under flexible rates as discussed below.
Perfect substitution between domestic and foreign bonds (RH horizontal)
leads to no qualitative differences in the effects of fiscal policy on output
or foreign exchange reserves, although the interest rate would in that case
remain constant. Perfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods, a
limiting case where the law of one price holds, on the other hand, renders
government spending powerless to affect output.22 As the private sector is
willing to exchange foreign for domestic goods at unchanged prices, government
spending on domestic (or foreign) goods can have no effect on prices or
output. (In this polar case, the CC schedule becomes a vertical line and
shifts only in response to a change in the exchange rate or price of foreign
output.)
-
Sterilizationmodifies the effects of fiscal policy, but output and the
interest rate still increase. If there is complete sterilization, then the
new equilibrium is found on an unchanged LL schedule at point b. The increase
in the money supply associated with the influx of foreign exchange reserves is
neutralized by the sale of bonds to the public. The bond supplies available
to the public become endogenous, with HR shifting to the new equilibrium.
There is a serious problem with sterilization, however, when domestic and
22For a description of the law of one price, see Katseli—Papaefstratiou
(1979). She distinguishes between the law of one price, which is a commodity
arbitrage relationship linking the prices of identical goods in different
countries, and a more general form of purchasing power parity (PPP) reflecting
a reduced form relationship between prices and exchange rates. For empirical
evidence on PPP, see Isard (1977), Kravis and Lipsey (1978), and Frenkel
(1981).
25foreign bonds are highly substitutable. The more substitutable are the bonds,
the greater is the change in foreign exchange reserves associated with the
fiscal policy.23 This can be seen by expressing the change inforeign
exchange reserves given in table 1 In terms of the changes in output and the
interest rate:
X dF =(H+ H/Q) dY + H dr. (3.11)
Since the changes in Y and r (to point b in figure 1) are the same whatever
the degree of substitutability between bonds, the change in foreign exchange
reserves must increase with higher substitutability (a larger Hr). In the
limiting case of perfect substitution between assets, the problem of foreign
exchange flows becomes overwhelming, as Mundell (1963) emphasized. In that
case, sterilization implies an infinite gain of foreign exchange reserves.
During the 1950's, analyses of macroeconomic policy almost invariably
assumed full sterilization of reserve flows, with monetary policy being
characterized by a constant money supply or interest rate. In the early
1970's, the monetary approach to the balance of payments largely ignored
sterilization or argued that sterilization was infeasible because of perfect
substitution between assets. Since that time empirical evidence has
accumulated showing that sterilization was indeed practiced widely under the
the case of an increase in government spending, foreign exchange
reserves rise rather than fall, so the countryisin no danger of running out
of reserves as it might be In the case of a decline in government spendingor
an increase in the money supply. This is one aspect of a fundamental
asymmetry between surplus and deficit countries under fixed exchange rates.
26Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates.24 But many of the same studies
have also shown the empirical importance of the offset effect, a phenomenon
which was central to the monetary approach to the balance of payments. It is
to the offset effect that we now turn.
The subject of monetary policy under fixed rates has generated intense
controversy, with many economists contending that monetary policy is powerless
to affect the domestic interest rate or output. That is because any
expansionary open market operation by the central bank may be completely
offset by a loss of foreign exchange reserves. (This offset controversy is
distinct from the controversy associated with monetary policy under rational
expectations to be discu8sed below.)
The monetary policy to be analyzed here is a simple open market purchase
of domestic bonds by the central bank, which increases the supply of money and
reduces the supply of bonds by dH. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of this
operation: output rises while the domestic interest rate falls as HH shifts
to the right to point a. Figure 2 also can be used to illustrate the offset
to the monetary policy. In the absence of changes in foreign exchange
reserves, the LL curve would shift to the right to L'L' as a result of the
open market purchase. This is the shift shown in the figure. with changes in
reserves, however, the money supply is endogenous, and LL shifts back to point
a in response to a loss in foreign exchange reserves. In figure 2, the offset
is negative, but it is smaller (in absolute value) than the open market
24For studies of sterilization in the 1960's, see Argy and Kouri (1974)
and Herring and Marston (1977, ch. 5). Black (1982) and Obstfeld (1982)
present evidence of sterilization in the more recent period of managed
floating.
27Figure 2. Open Market Operation
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L'i' Lpurchase. Hence monetary policy still retains some effectiveness.
To determine under what conditions the offset is complete, we express the
change in foreign exchange reserves as follows:25
XdFm {L(Gy + G/Q) —Gr(Ly+ L/Q)]
dH
—1—
[Hr(Gy+ G/Q) —C(H+
. (3.12)
It is clear from this expression that if there is perfect substitutability
between assets (}L infinite), the offset coefficient is equal to —1. In that
case, monetary policy is powerless to affect output or the interest rate. In
figure 2, HH becomes horizontal and is unaffected by changes in bond supplies,
éo point a coincides with point o. Short of perfect substitutability,
however, the offset is less than complete (XdFm/dH > —1). Note that the
offset could be positive rather than negative -in the perhaps unlikely case
where the increase in output (and price) causes a net shift out of foreign
bonds to satisfy the demand for transactions balances.26
The empirical evidence on offset behavior suggests that the offset
coefficient is negative and large, but significantly different from minus
one. Kouri and Porter (1974), for example, estimated that the offset
25Th1s expression is obtained by éolving the equations of table 1 for the
case of no sterilization.
26See Branson (1974) for a discussion of this case. Using (3.12), it
canbeshown that high substitutibility between domestic and foreign bonds or
low sensitivity of expenditure to real interest rates is sufficient to rule
Out a positive offset. Geometrically, a positive offset occurs when L'L' and
H'II' intersect below the CC line.
28coefficient for Germany was —.77 based on evidence from the 1960?s.27 There
are two ways of looking at such evidence. One is to say that the offset is
less than complete, so the central bank retains control over themoney
supply. But there is another side to this good news. An offset as large as
—.77 implies a sizable change in foreign exchange reserves forany given (net)
change in the money supply. The higher the degree of asset substitutability,
in effect, the greater the change in foreign exchange reserves associated with
any active monetary policy. For this very reason, countries such as Germany
became increasingly disenchanted with fixed exchange rates during the late
1960's. Germany'sattemptsto pursue a tight monetary policy led to large
surpluses in its overall balance of payments which in turn generatedpressure
from its trading partners for changes in its policies. Exchange rate
flexibility seemed to provide a solution; the German money supply could then
be under the full control of its authorities. Controlling one'smoney supply,
however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an effective monetary
policy, as we shall see below.
27For the same period, Herring and Marston(1977, ch. 6) present
estimates of a net offset coefficient which takes into account sterilization
behavior. Most estimates of the offset effect are based on financial behavior
only, whereas the general expression for the offset coefficient presented in
3.12 also takes into account behavior in the goods market (which affects the
size of the offset coefficient when Gr0). For an estimate of the offset
effect based on an economy—wide econometric model, the RDX2 for Canada,see
Helliwell and Lester (1976).
293.3. Stabilization policy under flexible exchange rates
Under flexible rates, the equations of table 1 determine domestic output,
the interest rate and the exchange rate. Foreign exchange reserves are
exogenous. Figure 1 and 2 continue to describe the determination of output
and the interest rate for any given exchange rate.28 But changes in the
exchange rate generally shift all three schedules.
The effect of exchange rate flexibility on an expansionary stabilization
policy depends first of all upon whether the domestic currency appreciates or
depreciates. An expansionary fiscal policy invariably leads to an
appreciation in the model outlined, just as it unambiguously leads to an
Increase in foreign exchange reserves under fixed exchange rates. (In the
Fleming analysis, by contrast, the exchange rate could appreciate or
depreciate depending upon the relative effect of the policy on the capital and
current accounts of the balance of payments.) The effect of the rise in
government spending and of the ensuing appreciation of the domestic currency
are illustrated in figure i.29
28We adopt the usual assumption that behavioral parameters are
insensitive to the change in regimes, an assumption which has been criticized
by Lucas (1972, 1973) and others in a closed economy context. Cooper (1976)
suggests that in comparing exchange rate regimes, we should take into account
likely changes in both trade and financial behavior, but to do so would
require the explicit modelling of the microeconoinic behavior of trading firms
and investors. In section 5, we discuss the influence of policy rules on
private behavior, and address more directly the Lucas critique.
29For a similar diagramatic analysis of private sector disturbances see
Henderson (1979).
30The rise in the demand for the domestic good shifts the GC curve upward,
but the appreciation dampens this movement. The appreciation also induces
shifts in the asset schedules (not shown). As X falls, the demands formoney
and bonds both fall. (Recall that Lx and Hx are both positive because of the
combined influence of price level changes, expectations and wealth effects on
the demand for these assets.) As a result the IL curve shifts to the right
and HH to the left. The economy ends up somewhere in the triangular area
bounded by abo, with output and the domestic interest rate rising.
Under certain conditions, output remains fixed despite the government's
increased demand for domestic goods; this is Mundell's well—known result that
fiscal policy is powerless to change output under flexible rates. To show
this, -followMundell in assuming that domestic and foreign bonds are
perfect substitutes (H.. is infinite, so that HH is flat). But we also need to
assume that the exchange rate has no net effect on the demand for money (Lx
0, so that the LL schedule does not shift). The following are sufficient
conditions for the demand for money to be independent of the exchange rate:
(a) static expectations, (b) a zero wealth elasticity of the demand for money
or an insensitivity of real wealth to exchange rate changes, and Cc) a unitary
income elasticity of the demand for money, which ensures that the fall in the
general price level raises the transactions demand for money and real money
balances by the same amount.30 If money demand is independent of the exchange
30For a similar set of conditions, see Henderson (1981).Argy andPorter
(1972) previously emphasized the importance of static expectations for
Mundell's result. This assumption also implies that HR remains stationary as
X changes. In the case of perfect substitutability between bonds, the
position of HR is determined by the uncovered parity condition, r —r+
whic[iisunchanged if 0.
31rate and if the domestic interest rate is tied to the foreign interest rate
through perfect substitution, then only a constant output (and domestic price)
are consistent with a constant money supply. Thus output remains at point o
in figure 1. Notice, however, how many assumptions are needed for this
result. Under more general conditions, domestic output must rise.
The effect of monetary policy under flexible rates is showu in figure 2,
where we illustrate the normal case in which an open market purchase of
domestic bonds leads to a depreciation of the domestic currency. The shifts
of the asset market schedules illustrate the direct effect on asset supplies:
the increase in the money supply shifts LL to the right to L'L', while the
reduction of the bond supply shifts HR to the right as well to H'H'. The
depreciation itself then leads to an equilibrium somewhere in the triangle
abc, with output increasing and the interest rate declining.3' Under those
conditions that produce a positive offset under fixed rates, an open market
purchase can lead to an appreciation rather than a depreciation under flexible
rates, but an appreciation is unlikely for the same reasons cited in
connnection with a positive offset.32
In the limiting case of perfect substitution between bonds, monetary
policy is still effective in changing output, since there are no changes in
foreign exchange reserves to offset the open market operation. Output and the
domestic price still increase; the interest rate remains constant if
expectations are static, anditfalls if expectations are regressive (because
31The depreciation shifts L'L' to the left, H'H' and GG to the right, so
the final equilibrium must be in the triangle bounded by L'L', H'H' and GG.
321f an appreciation occurs, the triangle is below the CG schedule, but
outputstill increases and the interest rate declines.
32HH shifts down by the change in the foreign interest return,dlix = dx).
Inthis limiting case, an open market operation and foreign exchange interven-
tion are equivalent in effects, if the latter is defined as an exchange of
foreign bonds for domestic money, since it cannot matter whether domestic or
foreign bonds are exchanged for money. But sterilized foreign exchange
intervention, involving an exchange of foreign for domestic bonds with no
change in the money supply, must be totally ineffective in changing output,
price or the interest rate.33
3.4. The relative effectiveness of policies and other issues
Raving discussed fiscal and monetary policy in detail, we can briefly
review the relative effectiveness of each policy In changing output under
fixed and flexible rates. Fiscal policy is always less effective under
flexible rates than under fixed rates, because an expansionary policy leads to
an appreciation of the domestic currency, thereby dampening the rise in
aggregate demand. Figure 1 illustrates this result clearly: With fixed
exchange rates (and no sterilization) the economy reaches point a; with
flexible rates, the economy ends up somewhere in the triangular area oab.
Thus there Is no ambiguity about the relative effectiveness of fiscal policy,
a result which differs from Fleming's. The difference, of course, is that the
movement of the exchange rate is governed by asset market behavior (the
relative slopes of HH and LL) rather than by the trade and capital accounts of
the balance of payments as in Fleming's study.
Fleming's conclusion with respect to the relative effectiveness of
monetary policy Is also modified in this model. Monetary policy is not
33GIrton and Henderson (1977) discuss bothtypes of intervention. See
also Kenen (1982) and ch. 15 by Branson and Henderson in this volume.
33necessarily more effective under flexible rates. But under the normal
conditions in which the offset effect is negative, Fleming's conclusion is
upheld. Figure 2 illustrates this result: under fixed exchange rates, an
open market expansion of the money supply leaves the economy at point a, while
under flexible rates the economy expands further to some point in the triangle
abc. Only if the offset is positive is monetary policy less effective under
flexible rates.
This type of analysis has often been used as a basis for comparing fixed
and flexible rates. One regime is preferable to another if it makes a given
policy instrument more effective in changing output. But the analysis has
frequently been turned on its head. Instead of analyzing the effects of
policy—induced changes in the money supply, some studies have analyzed the
effects of monetary disturbances, unwanted changes in money demand or
supply.34 Similarly, aggregate demand disturbances originating in private
behavior (e.g., shifts in demand from domestic to foreign goods) have often
been analyzed in place of changes in government spending. The choice between
exchange rate regimes then hinges on which regime minimizes the effects of the
disturbances on output. This different perspective is commonly found in
the new stochastic literature to be discussed in sections 5 and 6. When it
comes to analyzing foreign disturbances, however, it does not usually matter
whether they are policy—induced or private in origin; in both cases we would
normally choose the regime that best insulates the economy from those
34There could be unwanted changes in the money supply in any economy with
a banking system if the authorities control bank reserves but not the money
supply. Bryant (1980) analyzes several important issues involved in the
conduct of monetary policy in such an economy.
34disturbances.35 We shall discuss the insulatingproperties of exchange rate
regimes in detail below.
Another important issue concerns the role of country size in determining
the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies. The size of acountry does
make a difference, most particularly with respect to thestrong conclusions
reached by Mundell (1963) about monetary policy under fixed exchange rates and
fiscal policy under flexible rates. We shall briefly review the modifications
made to his analysis by drawing on his follow—up study, Mundell (1964).
If the domestic country is large enough to affect economic conditions in
the rest of the world, monetary policy under fixed exchange rates regains its
effectiveness. But with perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign
bonds, the money supplies of different countries are fully linked through
capital movements, and the domestic country can change its own money supply
only by changing the money supply of the world as a whole. For the same
reason, an open market operation abroad has as much effect on domestic output
as an open market operation at home of equal magnitude.
As far as fiscal policy under flexible rates is concerned, this policy
also regains its effectiveness, even under Mundell's assumptions, if the
domestic country Is large enough to influence foreign conditions. An increase
in government spending in the domestic country leads to an appreciation of the
35A specific policy initiative by a foreigngovernment could very well be
welcomed by the domestic country if it happened to have beneficial effects on
the domestic economy, but in general countries prefer to be insulated from
policy initiatives abroad. Domestic and foreign initiatives, however, might
be coordinated by the governments concerned. Cooper (1969) and Bryant (1980)
discuss problems of policy coordination.
35domestic currency and a deterioration of the trade balance, as it did in the
small country case. But the foreign country thereby experiences a boom, so
that outputs and interest rates rise in both countries. Mundell considers an
interesting special case where the two countries have identical income
elasticities of the demand for money. In this case, the rise in government
spending at home raises output at home relative to output abroad in proportion
to the ratio of domestic to foreign output. Two countries of equal size, for
example, would share equally in the expansion even though the increase in
government spending fell solely on domestic goods. It is only when this ratio
approaches zero that fiscal policy becomes ineffective in changing output.
For further discussion of these and other results from two country models, the
reader is referred to the excellent survey of macroeconomic interdependence by
Mussa (1979).
Until this point we have evaluated fiscal and monetary policies
separately and have judged each according to its effects on domestic output.
We might also be concerned with the balance of payments or other external
effects of the policies, however, and might therefore ask if it is possible to
achieve both internal and external balance using fiscal and monetary policies
together.36 According to Tinbergen's (1952) famous rule, to achieve a given
number of independent targets we imist have as many independent instruments.
Here we have two instruments, monetary and fiscal policy, and they can be
varied to achieve two independent targets, since the policies generally differ
in their relative impacts on output and external balance (defined in this
36We confine our discussion to fixed exchange rates, although similar
issues arise under flexible rates.
36model as a desired value of foreign exchange reserves).37
To the requirement that the number of instruments be as large as the
number of targets, Mundell (1962) added another condition: that each policy
instrument be directed toward that target for which it has relatively greater
impact; he termed this the "principle of effective market classification."38
In the flow models of the 1960's, monetary policy had a comparative advantage
over fiscal policy in achieving balance of payments equilibrium under fixed
exchange rates. In the model specified here, however, that comparative
advantage no longer holds in all cases. If the substitutability between
domestic and foreign bonds is low enough, for example, monetary policy may
have no net effect on foreign exchange reserves (the razor's edge case between
a negative and positive offset). With perfect substitutability between bonds,
on the other hand, the only effect of monetary policy is on foreign exchange
reserves, as discussed before. So the degree of asset substitutability is
also crucial in determining the comparative advantage of the two policies.
Today, concern over the balance of payments (or the exchange rate under
flexible rates) uld probably be replaced by concern over the price level or
inflation rate. And assumptions about decentralized decisionmaking that lay
371n the asset model specified here, it is more natural to define
external balance in terms of a desired level of foreign exchange reserves
rather than a desired value for their time derivative (the balance of
payments).
38Th1s condition was necessary for dynamic stability in Mundell's model,
when t different authorities controlled monetary and fiscal policy. Note
that in this study, unlike the other cited earlier, Mundell assumed imperfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds.
37behind Mundell's analysis would probably be replaced with assumptions about
information asymmetries between the government and private agents. We discuss
price behavior in the next section and those following, while information
asymmetries are discussed in section 5.
4. Flexible wages and the monetary approach
The macroeconomic model introduced so far displays the rigid nominal
wages characteristic of Keynesian models of the 1960's and earlier, even while
it incorporates asset behavior reflecting portfolio theory as it has developed
in the 1970's. With the rise in inflation in the late 1960's, the assumption
of rigid wages became increasingly untenable. As a result, some form of wage
flexibility has become a feature of many open economy models. In the next
section we will discuss contract models of wage determination which fix wages
only temporarily. But before doing so we will introduce a simple classical
model with perfectly flexible wages. This model will help to clarify the role
of wealth effects in the economy's adjustment to long run equilibrium. In the
monetary approach to the balance of payments, these wealth effects constitute
the main channel through which a devaluation affects the real sector of the
economy. In addition, the model will describe a full information equilibrium
which will serve as a benchmark for the new classical models to be described
in the next section.
4.1. A model with flexible wages
The behavior of the model introduced in earlier sections changes markedly
when wages become flexible. In an open economy, however, output does not
become exogenous under this classical assumption; instead, aggregate supply
becomes a function of the terms of trade, To see why this is true,
first consider labor supply behavior in an open economy. If labor consumes
both domestic and foreign goods, the supply of labor should be responsive to
38the nominal wage relative to the general price level, I, rather than the price
of domestic goods, P:
N8N8(W/I). (4.1)
The domestic producer, on the other hand, measures wages relative to the price
of the good which he produces, so the demand for labor should be of the form:
NdNd(W/P). (4.2)
W/I is often called labor's real wage, while W/P is called the producer's real
wage.39 If the supply and demand equations are solved for an equilibriumwage
and quantity of labor, and if the production function (3.4) is used to
determine output, the result is a new supply equation of the form:
Y Q(P/PX), Q;> 0 . (4.3)
Anydisturbancethat changes the terms of trade also changes output.
Withthenew aggregate supply equation replacing (3.4) in the original
model, we still have a four equation system determining Y, P, r, and X or
XF'5. This system is more difficult to describe, however, since the domestic
price can no longer be easily eliminated from the system. To make the system
more manageable, we replace the bond equation with an uncovered parity
condition, r —rL+ ,byassuming that domestic and foreign bonds are
perfect substitutes. This assumption, in fact, is almost always adopted in
the monetary approach and in the stochastic models to be discussed shortly.
In addition, we assumethatallexpectationsare static, i.e., is zero and
so the domestic interest rate is equaltothe exogenous foreign rate. We
39Cliapter 16 by Bruce and Purvisdiscusseslabor market behavior in
more detail. For a similar description of the labor market, see Salop (1974),
Purvis(1979),Branson and Rotemberg (1980) andSachs (1980).Laterwe
discuss models where labor's real wage is kept rigid by Indexation.
39briefly discuss the more general case below.
The parity condition allows us to eliminate the domestic interest rate
from the aggregate demand and aggregate supply equations and from the
equilibrium conditions for the money market. We can write the aggregate
demand and supply equations in differential form, solving for the change in
the domestic price in order to show the adjustment of this price more clearly:
dP —dX÷dY/Q
, (4.4)
C C dG
dP——-dX—dY+--- (4.5)
Sp 'Jp
These two equations can be illustrated in Y—P space as in figure 3. Under
fixed exchange rates, the two schedules alone determine domestic output and
price. The money market equation determines the change in foreign exchange
reserves recursively. The system of equations under fixed exchange rates is
thus qualitatively similar to the Keynesian system outlined above, at least as
long as the foreign price is constant. If the exchange rate changes, however,
both schedules in figure 3 are affected. (For a similar diagramatic analysis
in a stochastic model, see Marston, 1982b).
'.z.rrectsor a aeva.Luatlon W1Eflriexioiewages
Row mich difference the new aggregate supply equation makes to the
behavior of the model can be seen by examining the effects of a devaluation.
As in the Keynesian model, a devaluation leads to an increase in aggregate
demand, which in figure 3 is represented by an upward shift of the dd
schedule. Whether this movement is proportional to the change in the exchange
rate is crucial In determining the net effect of the devaluation, so we use
equation (4.5) and the definitions of table 1 to express the (vertical) shift
of the dd curve as follows:
d (1+Bz)ZA(A_F")
. (4.6)
40The upward shift of the aggregate demand schedule is less than proportional if
ZA > 0, where ZA is the derivative of expenditure with respect to real
wealth. With money and domestic bonds fixed in nominal value at any point in
time, the devaluation reduces the real value of domestic wealth (in proportion
to A —FdM + Hd); the sensitivity of aggregate demand to real wealth then
holds down the increase in aggregate demand. Aggregate supply also adjusts
upward because of the increase in nominal wages induced by the higher domestic
price for the foreign good. In the case of the supply schedule, the upward
shift Is proportional because equal increases in X and P would raisewages
proportionally and would leave output unchanged.
From figure 3 it is evident that output actually declines and the
domestic price rises less than proportionately in response to the
devaluation. (See point a). With changes in exchange rates affecting real
wealth because some assets are fixed in nominal value, the devaluation has
real effects despite the flexibility of wages. This is a familiar result in
classical models,4° The fall in output and the terms of trade generates a
trade surplus for the devaluing country. As a result, the immediate Impact of
the devaluation on domestic prices and output is different from its long run
impact. That is because the trade surplus leads to a (flow) increase in
wealth,
A—PB>O, (4.7)
which moves the short runasset marketequilibrium continuously toward a long
rim steady state. In that steady state, the trade account reaches equilibrium
with total nominal assets Increasing proportionally to the change in the
exchange rate: dA/A —dX/X.Wages and prices also increase proportionally in
405ee Metzler's (1951) treatment ofmonetary policy in a closed economy.
41the long run, so output returns to its initial level.
This process of wealth accumulation is an essential feature of the
monetary approach to the balance of payments.4' In many versions of this
approach, money is the only asset so that real money balances rather than real
wealth drive the accumulation process. As long as the domestic credit
component of the monetary base is kept constant, moreover, foreign exchange
reserves grow along with money balances so that the equation describing wealth
accumulation explains the balance of payments.
Consider a simple version of this approach taken from Dornbusch's (1973)
well—known study of devaluation
Md=kPV (4.8)
X (4.9)
i_y(kP!_M),whereM.Hm+XFm. (4.10)
The first equation is a quantity theory formulation for the demand for money.
The second equation states the law of one price reflecting the assumption that
domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes. The third equation
specifies a wealth accumulation process that relates the rate of hoarding
(income less expenditure) to the difference between money demand and
41Frenlcel and Johnson (1976) trace the origins of this approach back to
the writings of Mill, Hume and other classical economists. Johnson (1972)
provides one of the earliest formal descriptions of it. For references to the
extensive literature that has emerged since, see Whitman (1975) and ch. 14 by
Frenkel and Mussa.
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Figure 3. Devaluation or Depreciation in the Classical Model
42asupply.42 According to this model, a devaluation has oiiy temporary effects
on the trade balance with the rate of asset accumulation being in proportion
to the difference between the stock demand and supply of money. Through the
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves the money supply in time reaches a
new equilibrium with the money supply having risen in proportion to the
exchange rate, dM/M dX/X.
Results similar to Dornbusch's can be derived using the model with
internationally mobile capital developed in this chapter. If we follow
Dornbusch by assuming that the law of one price holds, then output is
unaffected by the devaluation. (In the aggregate supply function (4.3),
output is fixed by the constant terms of trade.) The price level rises in
response to the devaluation, however, so the demand for money immediately
rises. With bonds as well as money included in the menu of assets, there is
no longer short run disequilibrium between the stock demand and supply of
money as in equation (4.10). Instead, asset holders can instantaneously
adjust their money holdings to the desired level by buying or selling bonds.
If money balances are a positive function of wealth as in equation (3.5), then
money balances rise immediately following the devaluation, but less than
proportionally to the exchange rate (and the price level):
dM mA ddX
(4.11)
the same paper, Dornbusch extended his model to include non—traded
goods and showed that a devaluation could have effects on the allocation of
resources between sectors during the period when money balances are
adjusting. In ch. 14, Frenkel and issa discuss a wider class of models
showing how the monetary adjustment mechanism is affected by relaxing these
assumptions.
43The trade balance also ries as can be seen by solving the income—expenditure
relationship (3.1):
dB =dY—dZ=
ZA(A
—Fd)dX > 0 (4.12)
The improvement in the trade account is directly proportional to the change in
real wealth rather than to the change in real money balances as in Dornbusch's
model.43 The trade account surplus, in turn, generates a flow increase in
wealth as in (4.7). How that increase in wealth is divided between assets
depends upon the sensitivity of money demand to real wealth (as reflected in
mA):
M/P —mA(A/P) (4.13)
The wealth accumulation process ends when money balances as well as other
assets have increased in proportion to the devaluation just as in the simpler
Dornbusch model.
This description of how an economy responds to a devaluation differs
markedly from the earlier elasticity and absorption approaches.44 In the
elasticities approach, a devaluation improves the trade balance by changing
431f domestic bonds dId not represent net wealth, the wealth effect would
be proportional to money balances only, A —FdN, just as in Dornbusch's
model.
44For a discussion of these approaches, see section 2.3 above. Earlier
studies of devaluation did not necessatily ignore monetary factors. In his
paper on the absorption approach, Alexander (1952) included a real balance
effect, while in his synthesis of the elasticity and absorption approaches
Tsiang (1961) emphasized the importance of monetary policy in determining the
effects of a devaluation. In both studies, however, the authors were more
concerned with the impact effects of a devaluation than with the dynamic
adjustment process which is central to the monetary approach.
44the relative prices of imports and exports, but in the present model there is
only one traded good. In the absorption approach, a devaluation works at
least in part by increasing output relative to spending, but here output is
fixed at full employment. The law of one price combined with flexible wages
shuts off both of these traditional channels so'that the devaluation must work
through wealth effects alone.
If there are no real wealth effects in the aggregate demand function
(ZA'O), then this dynamicaccumulationprocess is eliminated. The devaluation
then leads immediately to a proportionate rise in the domestic price even when
domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes. (Aggregate demand rises
to point b in figure 3.) The terms of trade are constant, and there is no
change in output or employment. Furthermore, there is no change in the
balance of trade, since it is a function of real expenditure and the terms of
trade, both of which are constant under these conditions.
Regardless of the presence or absence of wealth effects, we must not lose
sight of the vital role played by wage and price flexibility in obtaining
these results. The contrast between the results obtained in this section
(with or without wealth effects) and the results obtained with the Keynesian
model could not be sharper. The Keynesian model predicts that a devaluation
will raise output and improve the balance of trade, while the classical model
predicts that its main if not exclusive effect will be on domestic prices.
When the trade balance improves because of wealth effects, moreover, the
classical model predicts a decline in output rather than the expansion
associated with Keynesian models.
In choosing between the two alternative models, the time frame becomes
very important. If we believe that wages are sticky in the short run, then we
should expect output to expand and the trade balance to improve following a
45devaluation, as the Keynesian model predicts. But once wages adjust, the
classical model becomes relevant, with an improvement in the trade balance
occuring only to the extent that there are wealth effects on expenditure. If
we believe that wages adjust rapidly, whether through recontracting or
indexation, we should expect the classical model to hold in the short runtoo
so that the immediate effects of a devaluation may be primarily on nominal
rather than real variables. The timing of wage and price adjustments is
evidently crucial, and that timing is likely to vary across countries
depending upon the extent of indexation and other factors.
4.3 Effects of monetary and fiscal policy with flexible wages
In both Keynesian and classical models, the effects of monetary policy
depend upon the exchange rate regime. In section 3 we showed that in the
Keynesian model monetary policy under fixed exchange rates is powerless to
affect output as long as domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes.
That must also be the case in the classical model, since the offset effect is
independent of wage conditions in this limiting case. Monetary policy can
affect output, however, even in the classical model if there is imperfect
substitutability in the asset markets.
The effects of monetary policy under flexible rates, by contrast, depend
upon the specification of supply and demand behavior in the model. In
general, the open market purchase of bonds causes the domestic currency to
depreciate. The effects of this depreciation on the domestic price and output
can be illustrated by figure 3, the same figure used to illustrate the effects
of a devaluation. As in the case of a devaluation, a monetary expansion leads
to a rise in the domestic price but a fall in output (to point a), because the
higher price of domestic output and the depreciation reduce real wealth. The
trade account goes into surplus thereby generating a flow increase in wealth
46just like in the case of a devaluation. The long run equilibrium similarly
involves a return of real wealth to its original level.
If domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes, so that the law of
one price links domestic and foreign prices at purchasing power parity,
however, then output is unaffected even in the short run. The primary effect
of the monetary expansion is to drive up prices in proportion to the
depreciating exchange rate. This is a common result in many versions of the
monetary approach to the exchange rate. Consider one version consisting of
three so—called "building blocks' of the approach: a quantity theory equation
for the demand for money (with real balances a function of the interest rate),
the law of one price, and uncovered interest parity:45
Mdk(r) pV , (4.14)
P X , (4.15)
r =+ , (4.16)
where —0if expectations are static. According to this model, an increase
in the money supply has no effect on output, but raises the domestic price and
exchange rate in proportion to the increase in the money supply: dP/P —
dX/XdN/M.46 Even in this model, however, the monetary expansion causes a
45Frenkel (1976) applies these three building blocks to explain the
exchange rate during the German hyperinflation. For a more detailed
discussion of the monetary approach to the exchange rate, see ch. 14 by
Frenkel and Mussa.
46Note that the depreciation of the domestic currency is less than
proportional to the increase in the money supply if expectations are
regressive rather than static.
47temporary trade imbalance if expenditure (not shown) is a function of real
wealth.
In order for there to be no real effects of the monetary expansion, we
need to assume that expenditure is unaffected by changes in real wealth. In
that case the economy is driven to point b in figure 3 just as in the case of
a devaluation. Both output and the trade balance are unaffected by the
monetary expansion as prices rise In proportion to the exchange rate.
Leaving aside the issue of wealth effects, we can ask how much difference
flexible wages make to the effectiveness of monetary policy. The introduction
of flexible wages into the Mundell model undermines his conclusions and those
of similar studies about the relative effectiveness of monetary policy.
Monetary policy is not more effective in raising output under flexible
exchange rates. On the contrary, it loses all of its effectiveness when wages
are flexible, and may even reduce output if expenditure is a function of real
wealth. Its principal effect, in fact, is to raise domestic prices. Monetary
policy under fixed rates, in contrast, leaves the economy at point o, where
price and output are constant, just as in the Keynesian model.
Increases In government spending have very different effects than
monetary policy If, as is traditionally assumed, the government spending falls
entirely on domestic goods. Whether exchange rates are fixed or flexible, the
rise in government spending causes a rise in the terms of trade between
domestic and foreign goods. To the extent that labor supply is sensitive to
real wages, this rise in the terms of trade increases domestic output. Thus
fiscal policy has real effects even though wages are perfectly flexible.
Consider first the case of fixed exchange rates, using figure 4. The
Increase in government spending leads to an upward shift in the aggregate
demand schedule to d'd', raising domestic output and price to point a. With
48P
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Figure 4. Government Spending in the Classical Model
48athe exchange rate constant, the necessary rise in the terms of trade is
accomplished solely through a rise in the price of the domestic good.
Under flexible rates, by contrast, the exchange rate does most of the
adjusting. As in the Keynesian model, an increase in government spending
leads to an appreciation because of the increase in the demand formoney. The
appreciation causes both the aggregate demand and supply curves to shift down
(relative to the fixed exchange rate equilibrium at point a).
Consider the case where there are no wealth effects on aggregate demand
or on the demand for money. The appreciation then shifts the aggregate demand
and supply schedules down proportionately from point a to point b).47 The
appreciation has no net effect on output, so point b must be directly below
point a. Thus, with perfect wage flexibility, perfect capital mobility and
the absence of wealth effects, fiscal policy has identical effects on output
in the two exchange rate systems. Output does change in both systems, but by
the same amount. The price of domestic output, however, increases less under
flexible rates; in fact, the appreciation of the domestic currency may be
large enough to induce a fall in the domestic price (as illustrated by
point b). Because of the appreciation, the general price level unambiguously
falls under flexible rates. As to the absolute variation in prices in the two
regimes, it isn't possible to determine whether the price of domestic output
varies more under fixed or flexible rates without further restrictions on the
parameters. The same is true of the variation in the general price level.
47The d"d" schedule can even shift down below itsoriginal position at dd
depending upon the relative importance of income and price effects on
expenditure, as well as other factors.
49This analysis changes somewhat when real wealth effects are present. An
appreciation of the domestic currency raises real wealth because the general
price level falls, so output rises further under flexible rates than under
fixed rates. The analysis changes more substantially, however, if domestic
and foreign goods are perfect substitutes. Government spending raises output
by changing the terms of trade between domestic and foreign goods; if those
terms of trade are fixed by perfect substitutability, then government spending
canhaveno effect on output.
To summarize the effects of monetary and fiscal policies, both are
modified substantially by the flexibility of wages. In the Mundell—Fleming
model monetary policy is more powerful in raising output under flexible rates
and fiscal policy less powerful. In the classical model, any differences
between output behavior in the two regimes depend upon wealth effects which
are of secondary importance in the Mundell—Fleming model. If there are no
wealth effects in the classical model, then monetary policy is equally
powerless in each regime, while fiscal policy is as effective In a flexible
regime as in a fixed regime.
Some of the new classical models bridge the gap between the wage
assumptions of the monetary approach and Keynesian models by explicitly
modeling the wage contracting process. In this new literature the distinction
between the short and long runs becomes blurred because of the central role
played by expectations. It is to this literature that we now turn.
505. The role of policy in the new classicalmacroeconomics
With many questions about stabilizationpolicy still unresolved because
of continuing controversies about assetsubstitutability, wage and price
flexibility and other issues, economists were confronted in the1970's with a
new challenge associated with rational expectations and thenew classical
macroeconomics. A range of new propositions wereput forward that redefine
and severely limit the scope for an effectivestabilization policy. Many of
the basic insights of the earlier literaturesurvive intact when rational
expectations are introduced, but specific results aboutstabilization policy
continue to hold only when disturbances in theeconomy, information flows and
expectations take specific forms which were neveradequately spelled out
before.
The new classical macroeconomics has beendeveloped mostly in the context
of a closed economy in studies such as those ofLucas (1972, 1973), Sargent
and Wallace (1975), and Barro (1976). The keypropositions about
stabilization policy can be summarized as follows: (1)Anticipated changes in
the money supply have no real effects.Unanticipated changes do affect
output, but random variations of the money supply merely raise thevariability
of output. (2) Monetary policy rules are ineffectivein stabilizing output.
McCallum and Whltaker (1979) have extended thesepropositions to include
changes in government spending. For surveys of this literature, whichis too
broad to be fully treated here, the reader is referredto Shiller (1978),
Buiter (1980), and MeCallum (1980).
This section will review some of the basic propositions ofthe new
classical macroeconomics within the context of anopen economy model. The
same model will be used in the following section to investigate the choice
between exchange rate regimes and insulation. Openeconomy versions of the
51new classical macroeconomics have been derived from their closed economy
counterparts, but there are some important differences in the open economy
versions which we will describe later.48
Before introducing a specific model, it is useful to point out several
common characteristics found in many of the open economy models:
(1) Expectations are rational in the specific sense that the public knows the
underlying economic model and forms expectations on the basis of that model.49
The open economy studies concerned with stabilization policy, however, differ
from their closed economy counterparts in their assumptions about what
information is available when expectations are formed.
(2) In the stabilization literature of the 196Os and earlier, economic policy
was commonly modeled in terms of discrete policy initiatives formulated on an
ad hoc basis. In the new classical literature, policy usually takes the form
of rules tying current policy instruments to past or current economic
disturbances. These rules form part of the model, and the private sector is
usually assumed to know them or at least be able to make inferences about
them.
48Among studies dealing directly with open economy stabilization policy
under rational expectations are Eaton and Turnovsky (1982), Henderson (1982),
Marion (1982), and Turnovsky (1980b, 1981). Other studies such as Flood
(1979) and Flood and Marion (1981) use similar models to examine the choice
between exchange rate regimes. Further references are given below.
49Black (1973) was one of the first to employ rational expectations in an
open economy context. Later influential studies include Mussa (1976),
Dorribusch (1976), Kouri (1976), the latter two employing non—stochastic models
with perfect foresight.
52(3) Supply is responsive to unanticipated changes in prices, which drive the
economy away from its "natural rate of unemployment' or its full information
classical equilibrium. In the closed economy literature, the supply function
is often explained in terms of a confusion between relative and absolute
prices, as in the "island model" of Lucas (1973). As Flood (1979) has pointed
out, however, this rationale is not appropriate for an open economy where
contemporaneous international trading and intranational trading are permitted.
Instead most studies base the supply function on a contract lag of the type
specified by Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977c) for a closed economy.50 In the
open economy models, supply can also respond to anticipated changes in prices,
as we will see below.
(4) Apart from the contract lag, almost all versions of the model exhibit
classical neutrality. There are no wealth effects in the aggregate demand
function, for example, and the supply function is homogeneous of degree zero
in all prices. An anticipated monetary disturbance, therefore, has no real
effects, and an unanticipated disturbance has real effects only during the
50Recently Lucas (1981) has suggested that the two rationales for the
supply function may turn out to be similar:
"(n)one of these (contracting) models offers an explanation as to
why people should choose to bind themselves to contracts which
seem to be in no one's self—interest, and my conjecture Is that
when reasons for this are found they will reduce to the kind of
Informational difficulties already stressed in my 1972 article,
for example."
This passage is quoted in Canzoneri, Henderson and Rogoff (1981). Flood and
Hodrick (1982) provide an alternative to the wage contract model which
explains inventory as well as production behavior in an open economy.
53contract period.51
(5) Most of these models assume perfect substitutability between domestic and
foreign securities. Notable exceptions are Eaton and Turnovsky (1982) and
Henderson (1982). Many models also assume perfect substitutability between
domestic and foreign goods, although this assumption is not necessary for most
of the results.
5.1. A model of an open economy under rational expectations
In order to illustrate some of these characteristics and to discuss some
of the more important results, we now introduce a model of a small open
economy under flexible rates. The model, which is a simplified, stochastic
version of the model used above, consists of three equations: aggregate
demand and supply equations for the domestic good and an equation describing
money market equilibrium.52 All variables (except interest rates) are
expressed in logarithms using small letters as follows: j =logJ, where J is
511f expenditure were a function of wealth, monetary policy would be
nonneutral in the short runifit changed the real value of wealth, as in the
money—bond model introduced earlier. See Canzoneri (1980) for a discussion of
wealth effects in stochastic models. Another source of nonneutrality is the
Tobin effect of anticipated inflation which changes the real return on money
balances. Fischer (1979) discusses thfs and other sources of nonneutrality.
All statements about the effects of anticipated money below must be qualified
if such nonneutralities are present.
52The main simplification is that wealth effects have been suppressed (as
noted above). The new aggregate supply function with its contract specifica-
tion, of course, is more complicated than the supply function used above. The
model is written in logarithmic form as is most of the stochastic literature.
54the corresponding level variable:
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Equation (5.1) describes supply behavior, which is based on a contract
lag of one period. As explained in the last section, the supply equation
takes a more complicated form than in a closed economy because there are two
prices involved in supply decisions, the price of domestic output and the
general price level (it), the latter a weighted average of domestic and
foreign prices,
i =aPt + (1—a) (p + x) , (5.9)
where p is the price of the foreign good whileXt is the domestic currency
55price of foreign currency. Output is responsive to the nominal wage relative
to the price of domestic output, but the nominal wage is fixed in period t—1
in the light of expectations prevailing at that time.53
The supply equation (5.1) is derived from a Cobb—Douglas production
function (5.2), from a labor demand equation based on the production function
which is sensitive to the producer's real wage, w — andfrom a labor
supply equation (5.3) which is sensitive to labor's real wage, w — The
contract wage, w, is based on expectations of labor demand and supply formed
at t—1, as in equation (5.4). If there is no wage indexation, the actual wage
is equal to this contract wage, as in (5.5). With wages based on last
period's expectations, output is a function of unexpected changes in the
domestic price. In an open economy, however, output is also responsive to
anticipated changes in the terms of trade, t_1E(pt — =
(1—a)1E(p
—p
—x),for the same reason that output is a function of
the terms of trade in the classical economy without contract lags described in
the previous section.
This contracting approach to the aggregate supply function has been
criticized by Barro (1977) who offers an alternative description of labor
market behavior which gives Pareto optimal outcomes. Barro develops a model
where wages are set in contracts but employment is made contingent upon shocks
perceived after wages are set. Such contracts dominate the simple ones
considered here, but bear little resemblance to actual contracts, as Fischer
(1977a) observed in his comment on Barro's paper. The indexation of wages to
prices is a common feature of labor contracts in some countries, but such
53t_1EJt denotes the expectation of t formed on the basis of information
available at time t—1.
56schemes correct only imperfectly for the contract lags. We discuss indexation
in detail in the next section.
Equation (5.6) describes aggregate demand for the domestic good as a
function of the relative prices of foreign and domestic goods, the real
interest rate, and foreign output (y). A rise in the foreign price relative
to the domestic price (a fall in the terms of trade) Increasesaggregate
demand, as does a rise in foreign output, while a rise in the real interest
rate reduces aggregate demand. In the case of perfect substitution between
domestic and foreign goods,g becomes Infinite in size, and this aggregate
demand equation reduces to the familiar purchasing power parityrelationship.
There are three financial assets in the model as before, but domestic and
foreign bonds are perfect substitutes in equation (5.8). The demand formoney
(5.7) is expressed as a function of real income and the interest rate, but not
real wealth; to further simplify the model, moreover, the Income elasticity is
set equal to one.54
In equations (5.6) and (5.8) expectations of changes in the general price
level and the exchange rate are based on information available in periodt,
including knowledge of the current exchange rate and price levels at home and
abroad. This expectations assumption is different from that in most of the
closed economy literature, where expectations are based on knowledge of last
period's price level. This difference is particularly Important in
determining the effectiveness of policy rules, so we will discuss it in detail
below.
541f this elasticity is not equal toone, a change in the general price
level, and therefore the exchange rate, has an effect on the net demand for
money proportional to one minus this elasticity.
57We begin by examining simple changes in the money supply which are
alternatively unanticipated and anticipated by the general public. This will
allow us to illustrate the crucial role played by expectations in determining
the effectiveness of policy. The analysis draws most directly on a study by
Turnovsky (1981), although other studies cited above are also relevant.
Thereafter, we consider the role of policy rules which tie current policy to
private sector disturbances.
5.2. Changes in the money supply
To examine several different types of changes in the money supply, we
describe the money supply below as the sum of deterministic and stochastic
terms:
m=m0+v, vt=avi+u.
The stochastic term has an autoregressive component, av1, in addition to the
innovation in period t, u. If the innovation is temporary,=0;if it is
permanent, cz1. Substituting this expression for the money supply into
equation (5.7), we can solve the three equation system for current values of
Xt, p, t as functions of the money supply process.55
— xv1A1(1+k1)u xxm0+ A + AA (5.10)
2 20
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55The system can be solved by recursive substitution or by the method of
undetermined coefficients (see Lucas, 1972). To obtain a stable solution, we
must assume the absence of speculative bubbles. Shiller (1978) discusses this
assumption.
58—c(g+ ga)(l+k1)m —=
AA u . (5.12) 20
where A1 =c+ g +ga> 0, A2 =1+ k1(1—c&) > 0, and
A0 =ck1+ (g + ga)(1 + + c) > 0, while x, j, andare constants which
are functions of the non—stocha8tic terms in equations (5.1 —5.8).
These expressions are used to interpret three different types of changes in
the money supply as follows:
(1) Unanticipated, temporary increase in the money supply (u > 0, a =0).
The immediate response to this type of change in themoney supply is very
similar to that discussed in the non—stochastic models with fixed nominal
wages. The temporary expansion of the money supply induces a depreciation of
the domestic currency. The depreciation is large enough to cause a fall in
the terms of trade even though the price of domestic output rises.Therefore,
the demand for the domestic good increases. With wages fixed during the
contract period, the rise in the domestic price lowers the producer's real
wage, so aggregate supply and output also rise. Thus during the contract
period at least, the change in the money supply has an expansionary effect on
the economy. A temporary disturbance, however, has no effect on theeconomy
beyond the current period; in the absence of further disturbances, the
exchange rate, the domestic price and output return to their stationary
values. For this reason, the rational expectation at t ofany future value of
a variable is the stationary value of that variable. The solution of the
model is simple, a feature that is especially attractive if several countries
are to be analyzed at once. If there were no contract lag, or if information
were complete at the time of the contract, then the monetary disturbance would
have no effect on output even in the current period.
59(2) Unanticipated, permanent increase in the money supply (u > 0, c& =1).
If the innovation is expected to be permanent, its effects in the current
period differ markedly from its subsequent effects. In the current period,
the economy responds much as it would to a temporary innovation. The domestic
currency depreciates, while both domestic output and price rise.56 (It can be
shown that output rises somewhat more in the current period if the change in
the money supply is permanent rather than temporary.) Since the information
lag associated with the contracting process persists for only one period, the
system reaches equilibrium in period t+1. The effects of the innovation in
that period are identical to those of any (other) anticipated change in the
money supply. They are discussed immediately below.
(3) Anticipated increase in the money supply
Fully anticipated changes in the money supply leave output unchanged
while increasing the domestic price and the exchange rate proportionately.
Without further complicating the model introduced above, we can illustrate the
effects of an anticipated increase in the money supply by focusing onv_1 in
equations (5.10—5.12); it represents the continuing effect of an earlier money
supply innovation (which we assume to be permanent by setting n =1).Both Xt
and Pt rise in proportion to vt_i, demonstrating the homogeneity of the system
in the absence of contract lags. Because the change in the money supply was
56Turnovsky (1981) has an interesting discussion of exchange rate
overshooting in response to this disturbance. Overshooting is by no means
necessary in this model, since output is endogenous. Whether overshooting
occurs depends upon a condition involving price elasticities very similar to
that presented by Dornbusch (1976), even though the nominal rigidities
responsible for the overshooting are quite different in the two models.
60anticipated at t—1, it affects currentwages, which are based on last period's
expectations, so the only source of nominal rigidity in thissystem is
removed. As a result, there are no effectson output in period t or beyond.57
This result can also be interpreted in terms ofthe supply function (5.1)
alone. Because the change in themoney supply is anticipated, there is no
unanticipated change in the domestic price to affectoutput, and the first
term in (5.1) is zero. In addition, the secondterm in (5.1), which can be
rewritten C1 t_1E(Pt —x
—p),is unaffected by the disturbance, becauseany
anticipated monetary expansion leaves the anticipated terms oftrade
unaffected. Thus we obtain the same resultas in a closed economy despite a
more complicated supply function. If there were realdisturbances, however,
supply would be affected through anticipated changes in theterms of trade.58
The preceding analysis has illustrated thesignificant differences
between the effects of anticipated andunanticipated changes in the money
supply. When changes in the money supply areanticipated, we are essentially
back in the classical world of section 4 wherechanges in the money supply
have no real effects. (Recall that theparticular classical world described
in this model is one where there are no real wealtheffects on aggregate
demand.) Unanticipated changes, however, do have realeffects, although only
57The announcement ofan increase in the money supply does have an effect
on output in the period of the announcement, although not infuture periods.
See Turnovsky (1981).
58Government spending,therefore, can have real effects even if it is
anticipated since (as shown in section 4) it changes theanticipated terms of
trade between domestic and foreign goods. See Marion(1982) and Turnovsky
(1980b). The effectiveness of governmentspending rules is discussed below.
61during the contract period. But notice that such changes have no
stabilization role thus far, since they are unrelated to those exogenous
disturbances that stabilization policy is designed to control. In fact, as
Sargent and Wallace (1975) have pointed out, these unanticipated changes in
the money supply introduce unwanted noise into the system, raising the
variance of output.
5.3. Policy rules
Stabilization policy is normally aimed at countering the effects of
disturbances originating elsewhere in the economy or abroad. The question
addressed in this section is whether known rules by which policy reacts to
these disturbances can in fact counter them.
In the illustrative model introduced above, which is typical of most such
studies of the open economy, policy rules do have an impact. To show how, we
first modify the three equation model introduced above by adding disturbances
to the aggregate demand and money demand expressions as follows:
y =g(p÷x
—— g[r—(Ei÷1
— +yY + g0 + u (5.13)
—1Pt+ —i
—k1r+u
. (5.14)
These disturbances represent random elements in private behavior, with a rise
in u (up) reflecting a rise in demand for the domestic good (money).59
What policy rule would be appropriate in this economy? Policy could
respond currently to current disturbances, since the disturbances are part of
59The disturbances have a mean of zero, are serially uncorrelated and
uncorrelated with each other. We also could have considered a supply
disturbance, but these two disturbances are sufficient to illustrate the
effects of a policy rule.
62the information set used in determining expectations. In thatcase, the
disturbances could be perfectly offset. But suppose that only lagged
responses are feasible. Then it is still possible, as Turnovsky (1980a) has
shown in the context of a closed economy, for a policy rule to modify the
effects of curret disturbances.6°
Suppose that the rule is of the form:
n d =
i'.].1t-1+ '2 Uti+
m0 (5.15)
that is, the current money supply responds to lagged disturbances. In that
case, output can be written as a function of the disturbances:
—c(g + g a) k n ck (g + g a)n —
A0
r
[i —
1+k1't+ +
1+k1
2] u .(5.16)
Notice that the parameters of the policy rule,n1 and n2, appear in the
coefficients of both disturbances.
Consider the response to money demand disturbances as reflected in
n1.
If the authorities choosen1 —(1+ k1)/k1, then output is stabilized
completely. The reason has to do with private expectations of future policy
actions. The public is assumed to know the policy rule and to know all
current information including the disturbances. So the public correctly
anticipates the future movement of the money supply induced by today's
disturbance: m+1 —
m0+ n1u. It knows that the domestic currency will
depreciate tomorrow, and the expectation of that depreciation raises the
current interest rate, thus restoring equilibrium to the money market without
any change in output.
In a similar way, we can compute the value ofn2 which will keep output
60For a similar point, see Weiss (1980).
63constant in the presence of the aggregate demand disturbance, u. Keeping
output constant, however, might be inappropriate. Barro (1976) has argued
that policy rules should be aimed at stabilizing output relative to its value
in a full information classical economy (i.e., one without contractlags)
rather than stabilizing it absolutely.6' And an aggregate demand disturbance
does change output in a full information economy. If the supply function
(5.1) for an economy with contract lags is replaced with a classical supply
function of the form:
* **f* =c1(p
—x
—
Pt
)+c0 , (5.17)
* thenoutput in the full information economy can be expressed as a
function of the disturbance:62
* c1 d —=
c÷g+ g a u . (5.18)
1 P r
According to Barro, an appropriate rule for monetary policy would use the
value of n2 which minimizes —y).(This calculation is left to the
reader.) Stabilizing output completely is appropriate only when the full
information Output is COn8tant, which would be the case Ifc1 were zero (i.e.,
labor supply were inelastic) org were infinite (the terms of trade were
constant).
Consider again why the monetary policy rule is effective in thisopen
611f the only Inefficiencies in the modelare those associated with labor
being off its (ex ante) supply curve because of the contract lag, then our
norm for assessing policy should be the output which would occur if labor were
on Its supply curve as In a full information economy.
62Note that output is not responsive to themonetary disturbance in this
full information economy, for the reasons outlined in section 4.
64economy model. What would happen if we adopted the lagged dating of
expectations commonly found in the closed economy (as opposed to theopen
economy) literature? The expected change in the exchangerate, for example,
would be writtent_iEx÷i —_iEx
63 Theanswer is that the policy rule
would become ineffective in modifying the impact of thedisturbances. If the
private sector cannot revise its expectations inresponse to current
information, there is no lever by which such a policy rulecan modify the
output effect of a current disturbance. This is Sargent and Wallace's(1975)
basic result showing the ineffectiveness ofmonetary policy. With lagged
dating of expectations, a policy rule can be effective only if thegovernment
itself has an Information advantage, and thus canrespond to current
disturbances even while the private, sector cannot.64
The reason why policy is effective in one case andnot in the other has
to do with the relative amounts of information available todifferent agents
in the economy. In the typical openeconomy model, wage earners' expectations
are formed at t'-l based on information available then, while theprivate
sector forms all other expectations based on information atperiod t.(The
63Both assumptions aboutdating are subject to objections. Agents surely
know the current interest rate and the currentexchange rate, so expectations
should be based at least partially on current information.But agents are
unlikely to know other variables currently, such as themoney supply and the
price index for domestically produced goods. We discuss the use ofpartial
information below.
64Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Barro(1976) both consider this case.
Barro suggests that instead of pursuing stabilizationpolicy in this case the
government should make available any additional information it has.
65government may or may not act on the basis of information at t.) If there
were no contract lags, wage earners could set their wages based on current
information, and a feedback rule would obviously be ineffective.65 (We would
be back in the classical world of section 4.) In the typical closed economy
model, by contrast, all expectations are formed at t—1, so there is no lever
for policy, whether acting through expectations or not. Asymmetries in
information provide the leverage for policy rules.66 And those asymmetries do
not have to include superior knowledge on the part of the government as long
as some private agents who have superior information know the government's
policy rule.
Two other strands in the literature illustrate these points further.
Contracts in the labor market which extend for more than one period provide a
basis for effective policy rules. Fischer (1977b) shows that with two period
65Contract lags, however, are not the only source of such information
asymmetries. In the model specified by Bilson (1978b), there is a difference
between the information sets of asset—market and labor—market participants not
because of contract lags but because asset—market participants have a greater
incentive to acquire (costly) information.
66Turnovsky (1980b) studies government spending rules in an open economy
with lagged dating (so that there are no asymmetries in information). A
government spending rule based on past disturbances can affect output by
changing the terms of trade as in a classical economy, an effect which is
absent from a closed economy. But the rule cannot change output relative to
its full information value (which changes by the same amount); according to
Barro's criterion, then, government spending is ineffective even in an open
economy. See Turnovsky (1980b).
66contracts, for example, a policy rule tying the money supply to disturbances
in period t—1 can affect output in period t. In thiscase the authorities
exploit an information asymmetry by setting the money supply inresponse to
disturbances which, because of contract lags, are notsimultaneously reflected
in wages (or at least in some of thewages, since there are staggered
contracts).67 As in the earliercase, the information asymmetry is due to a
contract lag, but neither the government nor the private sector need have
information beyond that available in period t—1.
Canzoneri, Henderson, and Rogoff (1981) have a one period contractlag,
but adopt assumptions about information different from either theopen or
closed economy models. (Their model is of a closedeconomy, but the same
point can be made in an open economy model.) They assume that someagents
know the current interest rate in addition to lagged values of theprice level
and output.68 Knowledge of the current interest rate allowsagents to predict
the current price level more accurately than would bepossible with lagged
information only. The study shows very clearly that thescope for policy
rules depends on the existence of an asymmetry in information betweenwage—
earners, who set their wages in contracts based on information available in
67Variations on this same themeare found in Phelps and Taylor (1977) and
Taylor (1980).
68This is the same informationassumption adopted by Poole (1970) in his
well—known study of interest rate and money supply rules. TheCanzoneri,
Henderson and Rogoff study shows that many of Poole's results continueto hold
when expectations are rational. Henderson (1982) extends Poole'sanalysis to
an open economy where the government knows the current value of the interest
rate and exchange rate.
67period t—1, and other agents, who know the current interest rate. These other
agents might consist of the government alone, the private sector alone (in its
non—wage decisions) or both.
It is quite plausible to assume that most agents in the economy make use
of current information on financial variables, probably more plausible than to
assume that they use all current information or only lagged information. What
is more controversial in this and other studies are the assumptions about
labor market behavior—that wage earners set their wages based on expectations
at t—1 (or at t—J in Fischer's model of multi—period contracts) with firms
free to determine output on the basis of those wages. Until more research is
done about labor contracts, these assumptions are likely to remain
controversial. But so also are the assumptions underlying other versions of
the supply function in models where policy is ineffective.
It is not surprising that assumptions about information are central to
the discussion of policy ineffectiveness. In all versions of the new
classical economics, supply functions are based on some form of imperfect
information about prices. But with the effectiveness of policy rules
depending so crucially on specific assumptions about information flows, it is
difficult to draw any firm conclusions about stabilization policy until we are
confident about the validity of those specific assumptions.
Apart from details about information flows, we need to know more about
the ways that agents use information to form expectations. There is a large
middle ground between the omniscience built into many versions of rational
expectations, where agents have perfect knowledge of the economy, and the
ignorance reflected in earlier expectations hypotheses. That middle ground
needs to be more fully explored. It would be particularly useful to know how
agents revise their expectations during the transition period following the
68adoption of a new policy. Indeed, McCallum (1980, p. 7.24) has described the
new classical propositions as being relevant only to "stochastic steady
states."
Further research clearly remains to be done in defining thescope for an
effective stabilizaton policy——research on labor contracting and the behavior
of firms, the gathering and efficient use of information, and the formation of
expectations. Whatever the limitations of the current literature, however, it
has had a profound effect on economists' views of macroeconomic policy. It
has shown how crucial it is to distinguish between anticipated and
unanticipated policies. The effectiveness of monetary policy, for example, is
very much dependent upon whether or not the particular initiative is foreseen
by the private sector. No description of a policy is complete without precise
statements about what the private sector knows and when it knows it.
6. Exchange—rate regimes
In this section we shift focus to another topic of central interest to
stabilization policy. Instead of asking whether monetary or fiscal policy can
help to stabilize output, we ask if fixed or flexible exchange rates can help
to achieve this objective. We have already addressed this question briefly in
discussing non—stochastic models but have reserved most of the discussion for
this section where expectations can be treated more formally. In most of the
models discussed in this section expectations are rational and supply is
determined by a stochastic supply function of the same general form as (5.1).
As in the discussion of policy rules, the economy Is assumed to be
buffetted by real and financial disturbances, but now we include some
disturbances that originate abroad. Flexible exchange rates are thought by
some to insulate the economy from foreign disturbances, particularly if the
disturbances are monetary in nature. We show that insulation is achieved only
69in special cases, although exchange rate flexibility does generally dampen the
effects of foreign monetary disturbances.
One prominent feature of modern economies, especially those in Europe, Is
the indexation of wages to prices. Indexation helps to adjust wages to
unforeseen shocks, but the adjustment takes a rigid form that can keep real
wages constant even in the case of shocks that normally require adjustments In
real wages. We show how Indexation prevents the exchange rate from altering
output and how It thus affects the relative advantages of fixed and flexible
rates.
The section concludes with a brief discussion of intervention rules for
managed floating and of exchange rate arrangements in a multi—country setting.
6.].. Domestic disturbances
Mundell's propositions about the relative effectiveness of stabilization
policies under fixed and flexible rates can be readily transformed into
statements about the effects of domestic monetary and aggregate demand
disturbances. In the Mundell—Fleming model, fixed rates are preferable to
flexible rates if domestic monetary disturbances are important, since such
disturbances have no effect on output under fixed rates, but merely result In
a change in foreign exchange reserves. This ranking of regimes Is reversed
when domestic aggregate demand disturbances are Important. The present
section shows that in rational expectations models of the type discussed
above, with wages temporarily fixed due to contract lags, both propositions
continue to hold as long as the disturbances are unanticipated. If wage
indexation is introduced, however, then the exchange rate ceases to have any
effect on real variables. For that reason, there is no difference In the
response of output to these disturbances under fixed and flexible rates.
To illustrate each of these points, we employ the stochastic model of the
70last section but with two changes to the supply function. First, we now allow
wages to be indexed to the general price level:
w =w+ b(i — . (6.1)
The actual wage, wt, may differ from the contract wage, w, if the indexation
parameter, b, is different from zero; this indexation parameter isassumed to
vary between zero (no indexation) and one (fullindexation).69 Second, to
simplify the analysis we assume that the (ex ante) labor supply function is
inelastic, so that the supply of output is insensitive to anticipated changes
in the terms of trade (C1 =0in equation 5.1).70 We make this assumption so
that full information output will be unaffected by the disturbances considered
below; we are then left with a simple criterion for judging exchange rate
regimes involving the variance of output alone. The aggregate supply equation
takes the following form:
=c(Pt_iEpt) —cb(it
— + c0 . (6.2)
In the absence of indexation, only errors ifl predct1ng domestic prices affect
aggregate supply, while with indexation errors in predictingthe general price
69For studies of behavior with wage indexation, see Gray (1976), Fischer
(1977c), and Modigliani and Padoa—Schioppa (1978). This analysis of domestic
disturbances follows Marston (1982b), although Sachs (1980) and Flood and
Marion (1982) present similar results in other models. Some features of the
study by Flood and Marion are discussed below.
70The ex ante labor supply function is inelastic (n0), but once the
labor contract is signed the amount of labor supplied is determined by the
demand for labor.
71level also matter. With full wage indexatlon, an unanticipated change in the
general price level can lead to a proportional adjustment of the domestic
price with no change in output.
The equations of the model, now consisting of (5.13), (5.14), and (6.2),
determine three variables: domestic output, the price of that output, and
either the exchange rate or the money supply, depending on the exchange rate
regime. If we assume that all foreign variables are constant, then we can
express the three variables as functions of the domestic disturbances only.
To facilitate comparison between the two exchange rate regimes, the aggregate
demand and supply equations are first solved for and Pt as functions of Xt
and of the demand disturbance, u. The resulting expressions, equations (6.3)
and (6.4) below, describe aggregate demand and supply behavior under both
exchange rate regimes.71
—c(1—ab)d (g+ ga) c(1—b) —
—
D U; + D (x —x), (6.3)
1 1
u (g + g a + cb(1—a)) —
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(x —x), (6.4)
—(i+ c(1—ab)) d D1
xt —x—
D u —-— u
, (6.5)
where D1 —g
+ ga + c(1—ab) > 0,
D (1 + k1)D1 + c(1—6)(g + ga —1)> 0
expectations in the model are assumed to be formed rationally, and
the disturbances are unanticipated and serially uncorrelated. As was shown
inthe last section, the rational expectation at t of or xt+l 1.
therefore the stationary value of that variable (here denoted byand ,
respectively).
72Under fixed rates, Xt is kept equal to x, with themoney supply being
determined recursively by (5.14). Under flexible rates,xt can be expressed
as in equation (6.5) as a function of both domestic disturbances, u and u,
by solving all three equations (5.13), (5.14) and (6.2) for the reduced form.
We begin by examining the effects of the disturbances in the case where
there is no wage indexation in the domestic economy, then we consider the
effects of indexation. When there is no wage indexation, the effects of both
disturbances correspond closely to those reported by Mundell (1963). A
monetary disturbance, representing an increase in the money supply or decrease
in money demand (u < 0), has no effect on output under fixed exchangerates;
it results simply in an offsetting capital flow. With a flexiblerate, in
contrast, a monetary expansion leads to a depreciation of the domestic
currency and to an increase in output as well as in the domestic price.72
Similarly, as in Mundell's study an aggregate demand disturbance leads to a
greater change in output under fixed rates. An increase in aggregate demand
raises both domestic output and the domestic price.. Under flexible rates, the
increase in the transactions demand for money leads to an apprecIatIon of the
domestic currency which dampens the overall increase in aggregate demand.73
72The monetary disturbance affectsoutput and the domestic price only
through the exchange rate, as equationà (6.3) and (6.4) indicate.
73Under flexible exchangerates, the direct (positive) impact of u on
in equation (6.3) is dampened by the fall inx (which reduces In contrast
to Mundell's study, however, output nonetheless increases even under flexible
rates, because the appreciation leads to a rise in the domestic interest rate,
thus allowing output to increase despite a constantmoney supply. (In the
notation of section 3, the coefficient Lx is not equal to zero since the
exchange rate affects the demand for money through expectations.)Thus there is less output variation as well as less price variation under
flexible rates. The similarity with Mundell's results should not be
surprising since the labor contract fixes wages even if only temporarily.
Eneconomieswhere wage indexation is important, however, these familiar
results can break down. To understand why, notice that the effect of the
exchange rate on domestic output is dependent on the degree of indexation in
the domestic economy. As equation (6.3) indicates, the effect is proportional
to c(1—b), so that full indexation (b1) prevents the exchange rate from
affecting domestic output at all. It allows the domestic wage and price to
adjust currently to changes in the exchange rate. Therefore, the difference
in output variation between the two regimes must be proportional to c(1—b).
And with full indexation, each disturbance must have an identical effect on
output in the two regimes.
In the case of a monetary disturbance under flexible rates, full
indexation restores the classical result that changes in the money supply
affect prices but not output; thus there is no output variation in either
regime. In the case of an aggregate demand disturbance under flexible rates,
the classical (full information) equilibrium is not generally restored since
indexation cannot substitute for full wage flexibility.74 But full indexation
still results in output varying to the same extent under flexible rates and
fixed rates. With such indexation, therefore, the choice between regimes must
74W1thc =0,the aggregate demand disturbance has no effect on full
information output, but raises current output as indicated by (6.3). Even in
the general case where c10, there is no particular reason for the two
measures of output to coincide.
74be made not on the basis of output behavior but on othergrounds such as price
behavior.
For a non—indexed or partially indexed economy, the original Mundell
results can be generalized in several respects, as a recent studyby Henderson
(1982) shows. Other types of disturbances can be considered, namelyaggregate
supply disturbances and financial disturbances involving shifts between
domestic and foreign securities (at least if these securities are imperfect
substitutes), Secondly, we can compare a "rates constant" policy, where the
interest rate and exchange rate are held fixed, with an "aggregates constant"
policy, where the domestic money and bond supplies are held fixed. The
results cited above generalize as follows: When disturbances originate in the
goods market, whether in the aggregate demand or supply equations, then an
aggregates constant policy is preferable, because it permits adjustments in
the interest rate and exchange rate that tend to dampen theoutput effects of
the disturbances. When disturbances originate in the financialmarkets, a
rates constant policy is preferable, because this policy confines the
disturbances to the financial markets. The Henderson study will be discussed
at greater length below in connection with optimal foreign exchange
intervention.
One study which departs significantly from the Mundeliframework is that
of FIscher (1976); there is no capital mobility andoutput is independent of
prices (and hence the exchange rate regime), being affected only by supply
disturbances. To choose between regimes, Fischer adopts a criterion basedon
real consumption, where consumption is defined as —Bt,nominal
output less the trade balance (in levels). The ranking of regimes established
above is reversed, with flexible rates being preferred when thereare monetary
75disturbances and fixed rates when there are goods market disturbances.75
Monetary disturbances affect real consumption under fixed rates, but not under
flexible rates sitice the exchange rate adjusts to ensure that Bt =0.Supply
disturbances affect real consumption in both regimes (since Y changes) but by
less under fixed rates, because the balance of payments plays a shock absorber
role in that regime. As Fischer shows, however, these results may be
overturned if output responds to price innovations, even if capital remains
immobile.
6.2. Foreign disturbances and insulation
We turn now to foreign disturbances. Flexible rates are widely thought
to insulate an economy from foreign disturbances, probably because of the
insulation achieved in models without capital mobility. The analysis below
shows that insulation applies only in special cases, and that in general
flexible rates do not even insulate the economy from foreign monetary
disturbances. This is the first of two central points that will emerge from
the analysis. The second concerns the tendency in the literature to define
foreign disturbances in terms of individual foreign variables such as foreign
prices or interest rates. As Flood (1979) has emphasized, this can be highly
misleading. Foreign disturbances almost always affect the domestic economy
through a variety of channels. A foreign monetary disturbance, in particular,
may raise the foreign price, lower the foreign interest rate and raise foreign
output, with the combined effects of all these changes being very different
from their individual effects. To analyze foreign disturbances, therefore, it
is necessary to trace these disturbances through the foreign economy.
75Frenkel and Aizenman (1981) use a similar model to analyze managed
floating.
76These points can be illustrated with a simple model of a foreign economy
subject to monetary disturbances. The model consists of three equations
paralleling those of the domestic model.76
—b)(p —_1EP)+ c , (6.6)
ff(f ff f =
—g
—(Ep+i
— +
g0 (6.7)
f f f f af In=p+y_k1r+k0+u . (6.8)
The main difference is that only one good is involved, so there are no
relative prices entering the foreign model. Aggregate supply, therefore, is a
function of the price of the foreign good alone; output responds to unexpected
changes in that price as long as there is less than complete indexation (b is
less than one). Note that the monetary disturbance is defined as a money
demand innovation but could be interpreted equally well as a (negative) money
supply innovation.
f f f The three equations can be solved forp, 'andr as functions of the
foreIgn monetary dIsturbance,
f ---f nf
Pt —p —us /F1 , (6.9)
f —f f faf —y——c(1—b )u/F1 , (6.10)
r — — (1+ c(1—b)/g) u/F1 , (6.11)
76The model is described more fully In Marston (1982b). This isan
example of what Flood (1979) terms an extended small country analysis; the two
country model is recursive, so foreign disturbances can be studied first in the
foreign model, then their effects can be traced through the domestic model.
77where F1 =1+ k1 + (1—b) ÷k1c(1—b)/g > 0
All three variables are affected by both foreign disturbances, although
foreign output remains constant If there is full indexation abroad (b =1).
Even with this simple model there are three channels through which a
foreign monetary disturbance affects the domestic country: (a) the price
channel, with the foreign price directly affecting domestic aggregate demand
(and domestic aggregate supply as well If wages are indexed); (b) the output
or income channel, also directly affecting aggregate demand; (c) the interest
rate channel, affecting the real interest rate in the aggregate demand
function and the nominal interest rate in the money equation.
Without formally solving the domestic model, we can summarize the main
effects of a foreign monetary disturbance under flexible rates, where the
disturbance represents a decrease in money demand or increase in money supply
(u < 0). Although It originates as a monetary disturbance, it becomes both a
real and nominal disturbance from the point of view of the domestic country.
The real disturbance is represented by the change in foreign output and
affects the domestic economy much as would a domestic aggregate demand
disturbance. It raises demand for the domestic good, the Increase being
proportional to g in the domestic aggregate demand equation (5.13). The
nominal disturbance is represented by the combined effect of a higher foreign
price and an appreciating exchange rate (which is in turn influenced by the
foreign Interest rate as well as the foreign price and output). It reduces
demand for the domestic good, because the appreciation is always large enough
to ensure that the domestic currency price of the foreign good falls. The net
result of a higher foreign output and an appreciating exchange rate can be
either a rise or fall in domestic output.
With disturbances affecting the economy in so many ways, insulation is
78achieved only in special cases. Even if there is full wage indexation in the
domestic country, for example, a flexible exchange rate does not generally
insulate that country from a foreign monetary disturbance. Wage indexation
can shield domestic output from an appreciating exchange rate, but it cannot
prevent foreign income from directly raising aggregate demand, much as would a
domestic aggregate demand disturbance.
Similarly, if there is perfect substitutability between domestic and
foreign goods, a flexible rate does not insulate the economy from a foreign
monetary disturbance. When the law of one price holds, the aggregate supply
equation is modified as follows:
y c(i —b)(p
—iE + c0 , (6.2)'
where Pt =p+ x. As is evident from this equation, unexpected changes in
the foreign price level lead to changes in domestic output and insulation is
again not achieved.
In order for output to be insulated from this disturbance, the law of one
price must be combined with full wage indexation in the domestic economy.
tndexation shuts off the one remaining channel for foreign influence,
unexpected changes in the foreign price. As these examples suggest,
insulation is by no means a general feature of flexible rates.77
A study by Flood and Marion (1982) raises two further points about
77Marston (19821) shows that insulation can also be achieved if the
foreign country is fully indexed. For another example of insulation, see
Saidi (1980), who employs an aggregate supply function based on an
intertemporal substitution effect rather than a contract lag to analyze the
effects of foreign disturbances.
79insulation and the choice between regimes. Exchange rate regimes have
traditionally been compared under the assumption that behavioral parameters
remain the same even when the regime changes. Flood and Marion argue,
however, that the extent of wage Indexation should adjust endogenously to the
exchange rate regime. The appropriate comparison between exchange rate
regimes, therefore, is one where the indexation parameter is at its optimal
level (according to an output criterion) in each regime. The same point can
be raised about other behavioral parameters such as the degree of asset
substitutability. The second point they make is equally interesting:
insulation may be an undesirable objective of exchange rate policy; it may be
preferable to allow foreign disturbances to enter an economy if this helps to
minimize the effects of other disturbances. The law of one price prevails in
their model, so that full wage indexation provides insulation from foreign
disturbances. They show, however, that under flexible rates it is better to
have partial than full wage indexation, even though it prevents insulation
from a foreign monetary disturbance, because partial indexation allows the
exchange rate to dampen the output effects of a domestic supply disturbance.
6.3. Optimal foreign exchange intervention
Since neither fixed nor flexible rates stabilize output except in special
cases, it is natural to ask if some limited form of exchange intervention,
"managed floating," might be best. Intervention might follow a rule such as
—;k(x
—), wherebythe money supply is varied in response to current
changes in the exchange rate. The polar cases of fixed and flexible rates
correspond to infinite and zero values, respectively, of the intervention
parameter, k.
Managed floating appears to be an attractive alternative to either fixed
or flexible rates. This is the message of Boyer (1978), who examines optimal
80intervention in a small open economy. He shows that in the presence of
domestic monetary and aggregate demand disturbances, a limited form of foreign
exchange intervention is called for, with the degree of intervention
determined by the relative importance of the two disturbances. Only in
extreme cases are fixed or flexible rates warranted. If monetary disturbances
alone affect the economy, then fixed rates are optimal. If aggregate demand
disturbances alone affect the economy, then flexible rates are optimal, at
least when money demand is independent of the exchange rate. If money demand
is positively related to the exchange rate, as with regressive expectations,
then the authorities should "lean with the wind," exaggerating exchange rate
movements to neutralize the aggregate demand disturbances. The results are
analagous to those of Poole (1970) for optimal monetary policy in a closed
economy.
The Boyer paper does not analyze the case where expectations are
rational. Nor does it explain why private agents fall to utilize the same
information that the authorities use in their managed intervention——the
information provided by exchange rate movements. Yet we know from the earlier
discussion how important information asymmetries are in determining the
effectiveness of policy rules. Henderson (1982) analyzes intervention in a
model with rational expectations, where assumptions about information are
carefully set out.78 Foreign exchange intervention is based on the
78Roper and Turnovsky (1980) also analyze managed floating rules under ra—
tional expectations (as well as other expectations hypotheses). They have an
interesting discussion of how "leaning with the wind' may put a country at odds
with its neighbors to the extent that there are implicit international rules
limiting intervention operations to dampen exchange rate movements. For a dis-
cussion of guidelines for managed floating, see Ethier and Bloomfield (1975).
81authorities knowledge of the current exchange rate and other financial
variables, but private agents base wages on information available in period
t—1. Henderson justifies this asymmetry by citing the relatively greater
costs associated with renegotiating the nominal wage compared with adopting
policy responses. His results are similar to those of Boyer and other
studies, except that a wider range of disturbances is considered. He finds
that fixed rates are called for if all disturbances are financial and that
"leaning with the wind" is called for if there are either aggregate demand or
aggregate supply disturbances. He also points out that a more complex
financial policy, involving two policy instruments, would be necessary if the
authorities had more than one objective or if the coefficients of the model
were not known with certainty (as in Brainard, 1967).
Other recent studies have investigated exchange market intervention in a
three—country or multiple—country setting. In such a setting, an analog of
fixed exchange rates is an exchange—rate union which fixes exchange rates
between two or more countries that float relative to the rest of the world.
(European experiments with such unions, beginning with the Snake in 1972 and
following with the European Monetary System in 1979, have heightened interest
in the subject.) Corden (1972) discusses the different forms such a union can
take, including the simplest "pseudo—exchange—rate union" involving no
explicit integration of national economic policies beyond the commitment to
fix bilateral exchange rates. A number of studies have investigated the
desirability of such unions, including the classic studies of Mundell (1961)
and McKinnon (1963). Recently, Aoki. (1982), Bhandari (1982) and Marston
(1982a) have applied stochastic models similar to that outlined above to the
79Tower and Willett (1975) provide asurvey of this literature.
82union question. Marston, for example, shows how wage indexation, trade
patterns, and the sources of economic disturbances influence the case for a
union.
Onealternativeto an exchange rate union in the multiple—country setting
is a basket rule tying a currency to a weighted average of exchange rates.
Branson and Katseli—Papaefstratiou (1980), Flanders and Helpman (1979), and
Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1980) have investigated alternative weighting
schemes for the baskets. Branson and Katseli—papaefstratiou, for example,
show how weights based on market power in import and export markets can
minimize the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on the terms of trade.
Canzoneri (1982) analyzes basket rules within a macroeconomic model similar to
that outlined above, showing that basket pegging is generally superior to
exchange—rate unions between subsets of countries. These studies point toward
a fruitful area for future research which will go beyond the two country
setting which previously dominated research on exchange market intervention.
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